I really do have difficulty communicating. It doesn't help when overloaded
terms/concepts like "organism" and "right-left brain" cannot be easily avoided.
However, some responses to Marcus and Glen:
1-Sure you can create a network of processors connected to a larger network of
robots and claim that you are dealing with trillions of inputs but that totally
misses the point. Robots only recognize a predetermined and homogeneous set of
inputs while a human entity must deal vast heterogeneity. and has evolved (deep
into the evolutionary tree) means to "make sense" of those inputs. I cannot see
how those means could be reduced to algorithms and replicated in in an
artificial system.
2-I am not using right-left brain as a *metaphor*. A huge body of empirical
evidence makes it clear that certain abilities, certain functions, are
associated with electrical activity in one lobe or the other; and how damage to
a lobe can eliminate specific kinds of abilities, including cognitive functions
like language and reasoning. That body of evidence clearly shows that
mathematical, algorithmic, linguistic, logical, ..., are primarily (not
exclusively) associated with the left-lobe. My understanding predates but has
become greatly influenced by the work of Ian McGilchrist (nearly three thousand
pages in three books), whom I have mentioned before.
3-My comment about left-brain lies and hallucinations is based on McGilchrist's
work.
4-I use the word 'organism" merely, and arbitrarily, as a convenient epidermis
bounded subsystem, ala the "embodied mind" literature.
5-Glen: you are correct as to our prior agreement. I see some kind of Venn
diagram, three overlapping circles with some kind of, as yet undefined, Grand
Unified Logic in the center common area.
davew
On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, at 10:57 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Dave writes:
>
> < BTW the human left-brain shares an interesting trait with LLMs. It
> lies and hallucinates, and frequently. >
>
> Glen writes:
>
> < What LLMs have shown us is that a mixture of 0 shot (akin to
> abduction), N-shot (akin to a mixture of induction and deduction), and
> reasoning/show-your-work (deduction) are sufficient to mimic human
> thought (or maybe merely human language). >
>
> Delusion seems more like a right-brain thing to me. Deception,
> premeditation, those are reasoning activities.
> Trump is in the middle, more of an N-shot, but also calcified 0-shot
> from a lifetime of accumulated, unedited, implicit bias. Some
> rehearsal to test how the generative model plays.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of glen
> Sent: Thursday, March 6, 2025 8:43 AM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?
>
> Yes. I feel like the left- right-brain metaphor is even more insidious
> than the brain as computer metaphor. I think I once got Dave's
> agreement that induction, deduction, and abduction were not disjoint
> forms of inference. Maybe I'm misremembering. But if that's the case,
> then it seems overly simplistic to suggest that a map between the left
> brain and a computer is a strong analogy but the map between the right
> brain and a computer is a weak analogy.
>
> What LLMs have shown us is that a mixture of 0 shot (akin to
> abduction), N-shot (akin to a mixture of induction and deduction), and
> reasoning/show-your-work (deduction) are sufficient to mimic human
> thought (or maybe merely human language).
>
> And it's also a mistake to map LLM <-> computer. LLMs are not
> computers. They're not really even run on computers, at least not
> without being WAY more particular about what you mean by "computer".
> The instantiated LLM (instantiated on a network of [C|G]PUs, with all
> sorts of little "glial" components as well) is not merely
> constitutively complicated, but also has provenance or heritage. The
> instantiated LLM didn't spring into existence like Athena. They've been
> scaffolded over space and time, relying on frozen stages of ontogeny.
>
> Where the analogy fails is in the (somewhat false conception of)
> organism and our fixation on it.
>
> On 3/6/25 8:09 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>> A large AI system like
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)> has more
>> transistors than the human brain has synapses, and mostly AI systems are
>> doing tensor operations, not working with symbols.
>>
>> Much of it could an analog system, or biological system like the CL1, if
>> either of those could provide competitive performance (someday). Even well
>> developed analog systems like https://mythic.ai/ <https://mythic.ai/> or
>> https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai
>> <https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai> aren’t really at the level of
>> TPUs or GPUs.
>>
>> Connected to a robot or a network of robots like self-driving taxis would
>> provide a constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs.
>>
>> *From:*Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
>> *Sent:* Thursday, March 6, 2025 8:04 AM
>> *To:* [email protected]
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?
>>
>> Pieter,
>>
>> I mostly agree with you about free will. if it exists at all, it is at a
>> relatively trivial level, like choosing Twizzlers over Red Vines when I buy
>> licorice.
>>
>> However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, /"I see no reason to
>> believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality
>> that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."/
>>
>> The fallacy that the brain is *just* another physical symbol system and the
>> mind is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a
>> simplistic, reductionist, Fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.
>>
>> The human organism—*as a whole*—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous
>> and constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is
>> involved in "preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.)
>> those inputs and the operation of the brain is totally dependent on that
>> substrate.
>>
>> Within the brain itself there is specialization, with a subset of the
>> substrate processed by right or left lobes. *NOTE: the whole brain is always
>> involved in any cognitive activity.*
>>
>> The left-brain's contribution to cognition is relatively small.
>> Unfortunately, it is both easy to describe and looks a lot like how
>> scientists, college professors, and programmers believe they "think."
>>
>> I will concede that anything the left-brain can do a computer can do. But
>> that is almost infinitely remote from what a human mind-organism can do.
>>
>> BTW the human left-brain shares an interesting trait with LLMs. It lies and
>> hallucinates, and frequently.
>>
>> davew
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, at 8:18 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:
>>
>> First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field.
>> Note to self: keep an eye on its development.
>>
>> Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?
>>
>> I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free
>> will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take
>> on free will).
>>
>> However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based
>> and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t
>> prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess
>> some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon
>> or artificial biology.
>>
>> Appendix, Grok's take on free will:
>>
>> Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.
>>
>> Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg
>> <https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg>)
>>
>>
>> Key Points
>>
>> * Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we
>> can make choices independently of prior causes.
>> * Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism,
>> while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.
>> * Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions,
>> but interpretations vary, fueling controversy.
>> * The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus,
>> making it a deeply debated topic.
>>
>> Definition and Philosophical Debate
>>
>> Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully
>> determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into
>> two main camps:
>>
>> * Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism,
>> meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those
>> desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because
>> you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by
>> upbringing.
>> * Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined
>> by prior causes. They split into:
>>
>> o Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is
>> false, suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.
>> o Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is
>> an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.
>>
>> Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if
>> determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination
>> Argument, which claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our
>> actions, not external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like
>> Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do
>> otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments
>> persist regardless of determinism.
>>
>> Scientific Insights
>>
>> Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain
>> activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making,
>> suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this
>> is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue we
>> can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for significant
>> decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s paradigm,
>> suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental
>> procedures can influence results (Neuroscience News
>> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>).
>>
>> Implications and Conclusion
>>
>> The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people
>> responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus
>> exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, even
>> if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist view
>> for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion continues.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and
>> Societal Dimensions
>>
>> Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of
>> deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific
>> research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its
>> definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader
>> implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper
>> understanding.
>>
>> Historical and Philosophical Context
>>
>> The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has
>> evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often defined
>> as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior events or
>> external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing otherwise in
>> identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading to
>> divergent philosophical positions.
>>
>> Key Philosophical Positions
>>
>> Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and
>> incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories:
>>
>> * Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with
>> determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to
>> one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior
>> causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is
>> considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.
>>
>> o Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests
>> free will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and
>> second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free
>> will, regardless of determinism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
>> <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>).
>> o Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
>> argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for
>> action, such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even
>> in a deterministic framework.
>>
>> * Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist
>> with determinism, splitting into two camps:
>>
>> o Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires
>> indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined,
>> possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to
>> decision-making, allowing genuine freedom.
>> o Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and
>> concludes free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result
>> of prior causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.
>>
>> The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often
>> define free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same
>> circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” includes
>> internal states, allowing for different choices if those states differ.
>>
>> Major Arguments
>>
>> To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments
>> from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:
>>
>> *Position*
>>
>>
>>
>> *Main Arguments*
>>
>>
>>
>> *Key Details and Examples*
>>
>>
>>
>> *References/URLs*
>>
>> Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Consequence Argument
>>
>> : If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section
>> 4a).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐
>> (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is true
>> (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).
>>
>>
>>
>> Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Origination Argument
>>
>> : Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism
>> prevents this (Section 4b).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2
>> (determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally
>> caused); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing
>> vs. self-origin).
>>
>>
>>
>> Kane (1998)
>>
>> For Free Will (Compatibilism)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments
>>
>> : Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or
>> reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire
>> mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and
>> Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk
>> decision.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Frankfurt’s Argument
>>
>> : Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section
>> 5b).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she
>> didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative
>> (Section 5b).
>>
>>
>>
>> Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes
>>
>> : Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by
>> determinism (Section 5c).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite
>> determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs.
>> being pushed); supports compatibilism.
>>
>>
>>
>> P. Strawson (1963)
>>
>> Pessimism
>>
>>
>>
>> - Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true
>> (Section 3c).
>>
>>
>>
>> - If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur
>> randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based on
>> chance.
>>
>>
>>
>> Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)
>>
>> The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that
>> if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving
>> no room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The
>> Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of
>> actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing,
>> where actions are externally caused.
>>
>> Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an
>> agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome,
>> but doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative
>> possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this,
>> arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist
>> regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility.
>>
>> Scientific Investigations
>>
>> Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new
>> dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using
>> electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness
>> potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting
>> decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free Will
>> Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>). This
>> has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard
>> determinism.
>>
>> However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by
>> Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness
>> potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental
>> procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not
>> conclusively disprove free will (Neuroscience News
>> <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). Additionally, some
>> argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them,
>> preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like
>> choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.
>>
>> Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful
>> choices, such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation,
>> finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real
>> consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The
>> Johns Hopkins News-Letter
>> <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>).
>> Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free
>> will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment,
>> with no room for independent choice (New Scientist
>> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>).
>>
>> Societal and Practical Implications
>>
>> The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal
>> identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible for
>> their actions, or should we see them as products of their circumstances?
>> Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free will can
>> increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for social
>> order (The Atlantic
>> <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>).
>> Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment,
>> and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical frameworks.
>>
>> Quantum Mechanics and Beyond
>>
>> Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are
>> probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free
>> will, allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with
>> critics arguing that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks
>> control. This remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another
>> layer to the complexity.
>>
>> Conclusion
>>
>> The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical
>> arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism,
>> and compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a
>> middle ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively
>> disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in
>> meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that
>> free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for maintaining
>> moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate will continue,
>> reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency in a
>> potentially deterministic universe.
>>
>> Key Citations
>>
>> * Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
>> <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>
>> * Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American
>> <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/>
>> * There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic
>> <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>
>> * Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>
>> * A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm
>> Neuroscience News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>
>> * Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins
>> News-Letter
>> <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>
>> * Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New
>> Scientist
>> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>
>>
>> On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <[email protected]
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> https://corticallabs.com/research.html
>> <https://corticallabs.com/research.html>
>>
> --
> ¡sıɹƎ ןıɐH ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
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