Getting there.  I could not find benchmarks for Qwen-72b or DeepSeek, but I bet 
they perform better.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.12474

 

 

From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Friday, March 7, 2025 7:46 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?

 

Ultimate (i.e., last) post on this topic:

 

Predetermined and homogeneous inputs (Marcus's networked vehicles): limited 
bits of the electromagnetic spectrum, LIDAR, cameras, maybe infrared, GPS 
positioning/location, velocity, a couple of others probably.

 

Heterogeneous inputs (human): bigger chunks of electromagnetic spectrum, large 
swaths of the sound spectrum, pressure differentials, all of the chemical 
reactions supporting taste and smell, the aggregated nerve firings that support 
pleasure/pain, vocal tone, pitch, rhythm (AI can do some of this already, and 
maybe more in the future), changing brain chemistry (endorphins, etc.), 
"psychological states" (something that arises between sensory inputs and 
cogitation), balance and orientation (inner ear stuff), ..........

 

Yes, you might be able to create artificial 'equivalents' for much of this—in 
principle, and if you had a deep understanding of how the human entity 
accomplishes what it does—but likely not before the heat death of the universe.

 

Or you can say that all of this is irrelevant to human intelligence and 
therefore need not be accounted for when crafting machine intelligence. Simply 
assert that the human ability to hear, read, write, speak grammatically correct 
English equals human intelligence, in toto, and therefore ChatGPT is 
intelligent.

 

The day that an LLM can pass the old Civil Service Exam, using the Chinese 
language, is the day I will admit AI might be getting close to human 
intelligence. NOTE: that exam was infamous because it required comprehensive 
knowledge of Confucianism and the Chinese equivalent of Confucian 'hadith'; to 
the point of recognizing a single nuanced variation in a character stroke was 
found only in the poetry of a specific commentator, a thousand years back in 
history, and therefore the character needs to be interpreted in this precise 
fashion. A lot of humans passed that exam.

 

davew

 

 

 

 

On Fri, Mar 7, 2025, at 9:07 AM, Prof David West wrote:

I agree, the problem of replicating the human mind may just be NP-hard, not 
necessarily NP-complete.

 

davew

 

On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, at 11:01 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:

Dave,

Regarding your statement:

However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, "I see no reason to 
believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality 
that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."

The fallacy that the brain is just another physical symbol system and the mind 
is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a 
simplistic, reductionist fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.

The human organism—as a whole—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous and 
constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is involved in 
"preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.), and the brain's 
operation is entirely dependent on that substrate.

I don't disagree that reducing the brain to just a "physical symbol system" is 
an oversimplification. My view is that the brain is a complex adaptive system, 
where the mind—including consciousness—emerges from the vast network of simple 
interactions between billions of neurons and other biological processes.

I also fully agree with your point that the whole organism plays a role in 
processing sensory input, and that the brain depends on this broader system.

When I say I see no reason this complex system cannot be replicated, I don’t 
mean with today’s knowledge or technology—it is clearly far beyond our current 
capabilities. I'm talking about the possibility in the future, whether that’s a 
year from now or a million years from now—I have no idea. My guess is somewhere 
in between.

Of course, this is speculation. But isn’t that how knowledge grows? We begin 
with speculation and build from there.

 

On Fri, 7 Mar 2025 at 06:21, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Question:

 

If we relied only on third person accounts, would the question of free will 
ever arise?   In what context?

n

 

On Wed, Mar 5, 2025 at 7:20 PM Pieter Steenekamp <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note to 
self: keep an eye on its development.

 

Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?

 

I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free will. 
Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free 
will).

 

However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and 
biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove 
it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some 
uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or 
artificial biology.

 

Appendix, Grok's take on free will:

 

Prompt: Please take a deep dive into  free will.

 

Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg)


Key Points

*       Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can 
make choices independently of prior causes.
*       Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while 
others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.
*       Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but 
interpretations vary, fueling controversy.
*       The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making 
it a deeply debated topic.

Definition and Philosophical Debate

Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully determined 
by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into two main camps:

*       Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism, 
meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those 
desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you 
love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing.
*       Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined by 
prior causes. They split into:

*       Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false, 
suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.
*       Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an 
illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.

Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism is 
true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which claims 
free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not external 
causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s argument, showing 
moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, and Strawson’s 
reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist regardless of 
determinism.

Scientific Insights

Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain activity 
(readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, suggesting 
decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this is debated: 
some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue we can still veto 
actions, preserving some freedom, especially for significant decisions. Recent 
research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s paradigm, suggests these 
findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental procedures can 
influence results ( <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/> 
Neuroscience News).

Implications and Conclusion

The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people responsible 
for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus exists, it 
seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, even if its 
reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist view for 
practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion continues.

  _____  

 

A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and 
Societal Dimensions

Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of 
deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific 
research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its 
definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader implications, 
offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper understanding.

Historical and Philosophical Context

The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has evolved 
through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often defined as the 
capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior events or external 
influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing otherwise in identical 
circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading to divergent 
philosophical positions.

Key Philosophical Positions

Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists, each 
with nuanced subcategories:

*       Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with 
determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to 
one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior 
causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is 
considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.

*       Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will 
involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order 
desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free will, regardless 
of determinism ( <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/> Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy).
*       Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue 
that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such 
as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a 
deterministic framework.

*       Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with 
determinism, splitting into two camps:

*       Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires 
indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, possibly 
due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to 
decision-making, allowing genuine freedom.
*       Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free 
will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior causes, 
leaving no room for alternative choices.

The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define free 
will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, 
while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” includes internal states, 
allowing for different choices if those states differ.

Major Arguments

To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from both 
sides, drawn from philosophical literature:


Position

Main Arguments

Key Details and Examples

References/URLs


Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)

-

Consequence Argument

: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section 4a).

- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐ (necessary) 
and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., 
Lincoln's assassination fixed).

Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)

        
-

Origination Argument

: Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents this 
(Section 4b).

- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism 
means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused); concludes 
no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. self-origin).

Kane (1998)


For Free Will (Compatibilism)

-

Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments

: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or 
reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).

- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire mesh, 
compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and Ravizza, 
1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision.

Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)

        
-

Frankfurt’s Argument

: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section 5b).

- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she didn't, 
but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative (Section 5b).

Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)

        
-

Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes

: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by determinism 
(Section 5c).

- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism; not 
undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being pushed); 
supports compatibilism.

P. Strawson (1963)


Pessimism

- Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true (Section 
3c).

- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur randomly), 
control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based on chance.

Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)

The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if 
determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no 
room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The Origination 
Argument adds that free will requires being the source of actions, which 
determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions are 
externally caused.

Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent is 
responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but doesn’t 
intervene, showing responsibility without alternative possibilities. Peter 
Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this, arguing that our natural 
responses like resentment or gratitude persist regardless of determinism, 
maintaining moral responsibility.

Scientific Investigations

Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new dimension to 
the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using electroencephalography (EEG), 
found that brain activity (readiness potential) precedes conscious awareness of 
deciding to move, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware ( 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will> Neuroscience of Free 
Will Wikipedia). This has been interpreted as evidence against free will, 
supporting hard determinism.

However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry 
Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential may 
not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental procedures can 
influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not conclusively disprove 
free will ( <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/> Neuroscience 
News). Additionally, some argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, 
we can veto them, preserving a form of free will, especially for significant 
decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.

Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, such 
as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that brain 
activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences, potentially 
supporting free will in important contexts ( 
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>
 The Johns Hopkins News-Letter). Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky 
argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum 
of biology and environment, with no room for independent choice ( 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>
 New Scientist).

Societal and Practical Implications

The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal identity. 
If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible for their 
actions, or should we see them as products of their circumstances? 
Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free will can 
increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for social order ( 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>
 The Atlantic). Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, 
punishment, and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical 
frameworks.

Quantum Mechanics and Beyond

Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic 
rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing for 
non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing that 
randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This remains a 
speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the complexity.

Conclusion

The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments like 
the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and compatibilist 
responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle ground. Scientific 
findings, while challenging, do not conclusively disprove free will, with 
recent research suggesting room for freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its 
societal importance, it seems likely that free will, even if partially 
illusory, is a valuable concept for maintaining moral and legal systems. The 
controversy ensures the debate will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring 
quest to understand our agency in a potentially deterministic universe.

Key Citations

*        <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/> Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy
*        
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/>
 Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American
*        
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>
 There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic
*        <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will> Neuroscience 
of Free Will Wikipedia
*        <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/> A Fresh Look at 
Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News
*        
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>
 Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins News-Letter
*        
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>
 Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist

 

 

 

On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

https://corticallabs.com/research.html

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--

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology

Clark University

[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson

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