A minor curiosity, If there is "free will" it is essential that there is a "willer;" that which wills freely. What is it?
Non-individuated consciousness/intelligence would not seem to be sufficient; only an "I" will do. But, to a [Vedist | Taoist | Buddhist | Alchemist | ...] there is not such thing as an "I," only the illusion of one. Similarly a material-monist (Marcus?) or a behavior-monist (Nick!) an "I" is nothing in itself, merely an epiphenomenon, neither a metaphysical nor ontological thing. It would seem that any argument, pro/con, for free will is dependent on a convincing argument for the existence of an "I" whether embodied in silicon or flesh. davew On Tue, Jun 10, 2025, at 8:09 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote: > I have two hats. When I wear Hat #1, I don't think humans have free will.. > > In this view, our minds are what happen when lots of physical, deterministic > processes take place—not just in the brain, but possibly in all the cells of > the body. There might be a bit of quantum randomness involved, but nothing > too wild—we can probably understand and model it pretty well. So, from this > perspective, free will doesn’t really exist. We’re following the rules of > physics, whether we like it or not. > > I don’t think current AI systems are yet capable of reproducing something > like the human mind, but in theory, I believe it’s possible. Maybe it’ll > happen soon. Maybe it’ll take much longer. But the idea itself is not > far-fetched. And even if we don’t get full human-like AI anytime soon, the > progress I expect from today’s "narrow" AI will still be enormous. Within a > decade or two, I think we’ll see major advances and a kind of radical > abundance in goods and services. > > Then I switch to Hat #2. > > This hat still believes in science, but it questions whether today’s > scientific model of reality is enough to fully explain the human mind. > > I asked Grok about Roger Penrose’s view on free will. The response was: > > “Roger Penrose, a renowned physicist and philosopher, believes free will is a > real phenomenon, rooted in the complex interplay of quantum mechanics and > consciousness. His ideas challenge traditional views, suggesting our choices > may stem from non-computable processes in the brain, beyond simple > cause-and-effect. While controversial, his work offers a fascinating > perspective on how we make decisions.” > > (Full version here: https://x.com/i/grok/share/aqBDuYD1GxnPOaUSu02UcP4uB) > > To me, this isn’t mysticism—it’s serious, thoughtful science. And if we want > to test these ideas, Seth Lloyd’s “Turing test for free will” is another > example of proper science being used to explore difficult questions. > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2025 at 01:19, steve smith <[email protected]> wrote: >> __ >> >> >> On 6/10/25 3:26 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote: >>> This conversation is well into bad faith now. I’m done. >> Let me dig into my reserves of "good faith" for those who might not have >> already exercised their free will by choosing to exit the conversation >> (ok... THAT was bad faith also! ) >> >> FWIW, the *only* thing I have to offer in opposition to the >> monistic/deterministic/no-free-will view is my own "experience" which is *at >> best* proof (to me) by example... it is not hard for me to grant that other >> "beings like me" have the same experience of "free will" (and other >> *qualia*). >> >> My mystical/abstraction-oriented/woo self tends to *grow* the scope of >> "beings like me" and even without the benefit of various organic alkaloids >> (et al) that others here might use to get into that mood? I'm pretty open >> to granting AI/ML models something *like* (my) consciousness, and by >> *extension* something *like* (my) free will... while *simultaneously* >> (read Lewis Carrol's Red Queen character) believing that determinism IS. >> >> My snarky flipness was maybe a reflection of the inner tension I feel in >> this discussion... that I can take either or both sides pretty effectively >> and don't find the arguments of one extrema very compelling to my other >> extrema (and vice-versa). The epitome of ambi-valence? >> >> Maybe there is useful meta-argument which helps resolve that? Maybe >> everyone else is able to get a good grip on one extrema or the other and >> recognize the opposite one acutely absurd? >> >> >> >>> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *steve smith >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, June 10, 2025 2:24 PM >>> *To:* [email protected] >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Free will—ghost in the machine or just clever >>> wiring?____ >>> __ __ >>> __ __ >>> >>> On 6/10/25 9:44 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:____ >>>> Consider a robot with sensors roughly comparable to humans.____ >>>> The robot has access to all the energy it wants. It has a large memory >>>> and generous computing resources. It has executive processes with >>>> onboard state-of-the-art LLMs to access vast information and can run a >>>> wide variety of appropriate programs to plan its next actions. It can use >>>> the LLMs to write new programs. It can tune or fine-tune the LLMs >>>> constantly from new data. It remembers its actions and their >>>> consequences. It has video and audio recordings of every moment. It has >>>> time series data of its sensors since it was activated. Because of its >>>> general self-tuning ability, any guidance from its authors (like for the >>>> LLM) can be overridden. It has americium-241 onboard hardware random >>>> number generator that drives its LLM sampling and any other stochastic >>>> algorithm.____ >>>> ____ >>>> Does this robot have free will? Why or why not?____ >>> Probably not unless it's brain is *positronic*. ____ >>> >>> For a *proof by anecdote*, read the corpus of Asimov's work. ;/____ >>> >>> Then go release an Orca into the wild and holler "Free Willy" at the top of >>> your lungs. If you survive being arrested and convicted for your >>> declaration of putative "public exposure", then note that the entire global >>> population are taking up the practice of head-butting sailboats.... free >>> will much? ____ >>> >>>> The perils of Free Will(y)?____ >>>> >>> __ __ >>> >>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >>> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... > --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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