In what sense did Nick leave?

Frank Wimberly
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On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, 6:27 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

> Eric,
>
> I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is that
> behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that someone
> else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been waiting
> patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor at an
> university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was and is
> not my intention.
>
> My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than yours.
> For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the cinemas
> I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological residue.
> This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our new AI
> friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node
> bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together if it
> looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas and
> write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you to get
> that academic position too.
>
> https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf
>
> Best wishes,
> Jochen
>
> On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote:
> > As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book (the one
> > I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in
> > Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated drafts to
> > some readers... so if any of you are interested....
> >
> > This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question here:
> >
> >
> > Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers,
> > “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen,”
> > which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, one
> > must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate that we
> > should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding the
> > mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime example of
> > that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is true,
> > either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then your
> > “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that
> > exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, and my
> > “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that
> > exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And _if_
> > that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such things all
> > we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about them
> > sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments demonstrated
> > this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in
> > combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many people
> > have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering proof
> > that a science of psychology is impossible.
> >
> > However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we do
> > not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we understand
> > his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of psychology:
> > Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the phenomena
> > they are discussing are, inherently, an example of
> > that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are
> > discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak about
> > sensibly.
> >
> > We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person deeply
> > interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the scrutinizing
> > you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that
> > cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to deal
> > with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that situation, and
> > then you should try to find other things to be interested in. We,
> > however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological phenomena
> > are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and we
> > have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in practice. We
> > believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand
> > psychological terms that is fundamentally different than Lavoisier’s
> > attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be right or
> > wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways that can
> > be readily corrected over time… because the things we are talking
> > about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital essence, or
> > other mystical factors having been included.
> >
> > We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things that
> > _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied. They are
> > aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be
> > recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately and
> > explained well.
> >
> > Best,
> > Eric
> >
> > On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> >> If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the rest.
> >> What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, thereof
> >> one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety,
> >> pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective
> >> experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot be
> >> meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I see it
> >> differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never
> >> understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the
> >> depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that
> >> substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just
> >> linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.
> >>
> >> For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the
> >> interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages,
> >> theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for pain is
> >> as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the
> >> agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". If we
> >> describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal by
> >> definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to feel
> >> pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for instance we
> >> can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most of
> >> us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or horse
> >> ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which
> >> looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ).
> >>
> >> This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the film
> >> maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema
> >> conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and they
> >> are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead actor
> >> because they see and hear what it goes through and they know what it
> >> feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According to
> >> Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must
> >> remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know
> >> what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the hard
> >> problem.
> >>
> >> -J.
> >>
> >> On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> >>> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of pain.
> >> And
> >>> …
> >>>
> >>> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen
> >>>
> >>> You just cannot have it both ways.
> >>>
> >>> N
> >>>
> >>> Sent from my Dumb Phone
> >>>
> >>> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini
> >> created.
> >>> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I asked
> >> Claude
> >>> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I asked
> >> them
> >>> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience -
> >> gauge
> >>> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for
> >>> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was able
> >> to
> >>> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs
> >> which
> >>> have different personalities often gives better results than just
> >>> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate and
> >>> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field
> >> theory
> >>> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, but
> >> the
> >>> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also
> >>> understand only half of it.
> >>>
> >>> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named the
> >> same,
> >>> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing than
> >> the
> >>> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the appendix
> >> with
> >>> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem looks
> >>> similar to this - in combination with the other things written in
> >> the
> >>> rest of the book.
> >>> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf
> >>>
> >>> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some
> >>> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for example
> >> wrote
> >>> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as regulations. In
> >> a
> >>> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my
> >>> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various
> >>> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has
> >>> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can be
> >>> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is a
> >> kind
> >>> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of it
> >> but
> >>> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what it
> >>> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it does
> >> not
> >>> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the animal
> >> well
> >>> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for example
> >> by
> >>> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain just as
> >>> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th
> >>> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we still
> >> eat
> >>> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We Love
> >> Dogs,
> >>> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?
> >>>
> >>> -J.
> >>>
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