Re: [FRIAM] A field theory of understanding

[glen]

And FWIW, your vTAO might be used in a declarative programming sense. Have you 
tried using one of the AIs to *implement* it? ... or at least simulate it?

On 11/3/26 1:19 PM, Prof David West wrote:

Tackling 'hard' problems is always interesting and frequently valuable.

However, instead of "using the tools we have invented over time," I would 
suggest a different perspective.

As Alan Kay once said, "the right perspective is worth 80 IQ points."

And, (annoying glen and many others on this list), because the hard problems are at the fringe and 
W.V.O.Quine has stated, "only metaphor can guide us here;" my current work, an essay, is 
grounded in a metaphor. One I borrowed from Hopfield who proposed the metaphor of a landscape to 
"explain" the operation of a neural net.

I have extended that metaphor and am using it to provide a different foundation for 
discussing, not solving the problem of,  "intelligence" and consciousness. I 
call my new model the vTAO for virtual Topographic Adaptive Organism.

glen has seen a bit of this idea and should feel free to denounce me as a fool 
or charlatan if he thinks it appropriate.

davew


On Tue, Nov 3, 2026, at 12:34 PM, j...@cas-group.net wrote:

We clearly have a different point of view here. I tried to find a
solution for the really hard problems, esp. the problem of free will and
the hard problem of subjective experience, because they are hard. As JFK
said "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard". Your
point of view seems to be that this is nonsense, because there are
problems that cannot not solved, where you simply cannot find a
solution, and if you still try to solve them you have not understood the
problem. A legitimate position. If this is the case then these problems
should be renamed as "impossible problems", which might be accurate,
because they are often impossible to solve completely.

The name for the hard problem still fits though. It is not only hard to
find a solution, it is also hard to find a consensus about what a
solution looks like, and if there is a solution at atll. I believe you
can find a solution and bridge the explanatory gap, not exactly, but
approximately, and to find a good approximate solution is indeed hard.
For me the hard problems are where it gets interesting, not where you
give up. For example there are many differential equations that cannot
be solved analytically as a finite combination of elementary functions.
But mathematicians have not given up, they can use numerical methods
(like Runge-Kutta) to approximate the behavior.

In the same way we are able to understand the hard problem by using
using all the tools we have invented over time to reach a approximate
understanding. This approximate understanding is not 100% the same
experience, but close enough to narrow the explanatory gap from Joseph
Levine. Humans can't fly. But we can build machines that help us to
reach the sky and go to the moon. Similarly Humans can't see what it is
like to be another human. But we can build machines (movie cameras,
go-pro cameras, cinemas) that help us to do it. Humans also don't know
what its like to be an owl or cat that can see 10 times better than we
do in the night. But if we use night-vision goggles, we can imagine what
it is like to view things in the night. Humans don't know what its like
to be a sperm whale or bat that can navigate in complete darkness. But
if we consider the sonars that are common for submarines, we can imagine
what it is like to view things by hearing: by sending out clicks and
listening for echoes.

Solving the hard problem is an achievement which is possible if we try
to bridge the explanatory gap by using the tools we have invented over
time. The interesting part is how the gap can be closed, although we
normally cannot do it. Different sensory organs can be partially bridged
by "goggles" like night night-vision goggles that extend our senses.
Different life paths can be partially bridged by cinemas and movies
which allow us to peek into the lives of others. Or simply by spending
time with the person you try understand, by sharing the same path for a
while.

Every hard philosophical problem that can be solved approximately is an
achievement. Free will is an achievement too, as Daniel Dennett wrote.
It remains an illusion unless you try to have it. Even then it is hard.
The interesting part to me is how we can achieve it, and how good this
solution is, although we normally cannot find a solution. It is also
interesting why the explanatory gap exists - which often has
evolutionary reasons.

Best
Jochen


On 2026-11-02 23:01, Eric Charles wrote:

Yeah.... Jochen...
I'm a bit confused by your reply as well... I am neither expressing
professional jealousy nor trying to angle for co-authorship on your
project... I'm trying to help you out here...

I'm pointing out that "The Hard Problem" is more like a Zen Koan than
a clearly-specified problem. Those who buy into "The Hard Problem"
will insist that any success you might have in "solving it" is
indicative of your not understanding it. That isn't to denigrate your
work, it is specifically to address any expectation you might have
that when you are done someone, anyone, might agree that you have
"solved The Hard Problem." That's just not how the weird
socio-cultural game surrounding that "problem" works.

IF you want to try to formalize our discussions of psychological
phenomenon, there are two reasonable ways approaches to The Hard
Problem: 1) Decide the "The Hard Problem" is legitimately pointing out
aspects of our experience about which we cannot speak sensibly... and
then really and truly let that stand... not trying to speak beyond
perhaps trying to demarcate the border, on the other side of which you
let silence reign. 2) Decide that there are only things about which we
can speak... and thereby fundamentally reject "The Hard Problem."

As such: If you are trying to formalize psychology, and you think you
can provide words and formulae to talk meaningfully about everything
in that domain, i.e., if _you _think the domain contains only things
that words and formulae are capable of getting at, then _you _are
rejecting The Hard Problem.

Of course, as Dave and Glen and others point out, there is no need to
care about any of this at all if formalizing (to whatever extent)
isn't your goal. Zen Koans aren't useless. Questions that ultimately
don't make sense can still transform our lives in meaningful ways, and
the world is often made better by virtue of containing people who
contemplate such questions. It may also be possible to get at things
artistically (poetically, musically, etc.) that cannot be gotten at
with formal systems of words and equations; that is a different
discussion.

Formal systems have limits created by the fact of their formality, and
some people believe there are things that exist fundamentally beyond
the limitations of any such systems. The Hard Problem is a postulation
of exactly the latter sort of things. As a result: You may find
benefit in working on The Hard Problem, but what you can't find is "a
solution", because it is crucial to the premise that no solution can
work.

Best,
Eric

On Mon, Nov 2, 2026 at 1:35 PM glen <g...@ropella.name> wrote:

FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your
language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless
for talking about that target."

The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can*
express anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without
nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the
*language* that forces those outcomes but the inferential system to
which the language is bound. Most people in my network are very
metaphorical thinkers, which allows them to slip and slide all over
the place when they hear/read an expression whose bindings are
ambiguous or unregistered. More literal thinkers like me aren't
incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we tend to resist it,
complain when we spot unregistered slippage.

More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips"
a suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens
come in, setting the context. Those in this class who are
charitable, either ask you helpful questions to choose which
inferential system to bind to. Uncharitable ones (e.g.
Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they feel like their
time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in the
blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts
yelling RTFM at me. 8^D

But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the
inferential system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud
Jochen's attempt(s) to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν
ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα
σώσω."

[⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something
rather than nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's
charitability. E.g. Sean Carroll is very charitable
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm not. To me, it's a nonsense
question and demonstrates the extent to which the asker is confused.
But you can *still* express it. And if you're amongst a crowd of
charitable people, especially if they're cognitively endowed, tokens
like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right
inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss?

8^D

On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote:

I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery??

successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about
Wittgenstein.

Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to

misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he
merely said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a
language that has been formally defined to exclude expressions of
that thing.

Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game

with strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game
that is contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make
the play.

If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its

core, there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of
psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules,
expressible in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or
"non-truth."

A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in

English is necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word
makes it "Something."

Wittgenstein never said, "shut up."

davew


On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, j...@cas-group.net wrote:

Eric,

I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is

that

behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that

someone

else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been

waiting

patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor

at an

university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was

and is

not my intention.

My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than
yours.
For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the
cinemas
I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological

residue.

This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our

new AI

friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node
bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together

if it

looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas

and

write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee

Group

solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you

to

get
that academic position too.

https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf

Best wishes,
Jochen

On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote:

As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book

(the one

I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation

in

Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated

drafts to

some readers... so if any of you are interested....

This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question

here:

Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers,
“Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man

schweigen,”

which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak,

one

must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate

that we

should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding

the

mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime

example of

that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is

true,

either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then

your

“feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something

that

exists only in your mental space, that only you could access,

and my

“feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something

that

exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And

_if_

that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such

things all

we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about

them

sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments

demonstrated

this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in
combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many

people

have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering

proof

that a science of psychology is impossible.

However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we

do

not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we

understand

his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of

psychology:

Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the

phenomena

they are discussing are, inherently, an example of
that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are
discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak

about

sensibly.

We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person

deeply

interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the

scrutinizing

you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that
cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to

deal

with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that

situation, and

then you should try to find other things to be interested in.

We,

however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological

phenomena

are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and

we

have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in

practice. We

believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand
psychological terms that is fundamentally different than

Lavoisier’s

attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be

right or

wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways

that can

be readily corrected over time… because the things we are

talking

about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital

essence, or

other mystical factors having been included.

We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things

that

_can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied.

They are

aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be
recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately

and

explained well.

Best,
Eric

On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <j...@cas-group.net> wrote:

If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the

rest.

What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak,

thereof

one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety,
pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective
experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot

be

meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I

see it

differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never
understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the
depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that
substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just
linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.

For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the
interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages,
theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for

pain is

as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the
agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts".

If we

describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal

by

definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to

feel

pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for

instance we

can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most

of

us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or

horse

ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which
looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ).

This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the

film

maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema
conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and

they

are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead

actor

because they see and hear what it goes through and they know

what it

feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According

to

Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must
remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know
what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the

hard

problem.

-J.

On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of

pain.

And

…

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen

You just cannot have it both ways.

N

Sent from my Dumb Phone

On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, j...@cas-group.net wrote:

Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini

created.

And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I

asked

Claude

and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I

asked

them

if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience

-

gauge

invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for
subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was

able

to

formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs

which

have different personalities often gives better results than

just

using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate

and

precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field

theory

of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics,

but

the

physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also
understand only half of it.

I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named

the

same,

only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing

than

the

old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the

appendix

with

this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem

looks

similar to this - in combination with the other things written

in

the

rest of the book.

https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf

Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some
researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for

example

wrote

he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as

regulations. In

a

post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my
behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of

various

sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”,

has

been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can

be

found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is

a

kind

of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of

it

but

for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what

it

feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it

does

not

scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the

animal

well

you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for

example

by

the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain

just as

intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th
eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we

still

eat

pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We

Love

Dogs,

Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?

-J.

--

--
8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα σώσω.



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