Re: [FRIAM] A field theory of understanding

[jofr]

We clearly have a different point of view here. I tried to find a 
solution for the really hard problems, esp. the problem of free will and 
the hard problem of subjective experience, because they are hard. As JFK 
said "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other 
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard". Your 
point of view seems to be that this is nonsense, because there are 
problems that cannot not solved, where you simply cannot find a 
solution, and if you still try to solve them you have not understood the 
problem. A legitimate position. If this is the case then these problems 
should be renamed as "impossible problems", which might be accurate, 
because they are often impossible to solve completely.

The name for the hard problem still fits though. It is not only hard to 
find a solution, it is also hard to find a consensus about what a 
solution looks like, and if there is a solution at atll. I believe you 
can find a solution and bridge the explanatory gap, not exactly, but 
approximately, and to find a good approximate solution is indeed hard. 
For me the hard problems are where it gets interesting, not where you 
give up. For example there are many differential equations that cannot 
be solved analytically as a finite combination of elementary functions. 
But mathematicians have not given up, they can use numerical methods 
(like Runge-Kutta) to approximate the behavior.

In the same way we are able to understand the hard problem by using 
using all the tools we have invented over time to reach a approximate 
understanding. This approximate understanding is not 100% the same 
experience, but close enough to narrow the explanatory gap from Joseph 
Levine. Humans can't fly. But we can build machines that help us to 
reach the sky and go to the moon. Similarly Humans can't see what it is 
like to be another human. But we can build machines (movie cameras, 
go-pro cameras, cinemas) that help us to do it. Humans also don't know 
what its like to be an owl or cat that can see 10 times better than we 
do in the night. But if we use night-vision goggles, we can imagine what 
it is like to view things in the night. Humans don't know what its like 
to be a sperm whale or bat that can navigate in complete darkness. But 
if we consider the sonars that are common for submarines, we can imagine 
what it is like to view things by hearing: by sending out clicks and 
listening for echoes.

Solving the hard problem is an achievement which is possible if we try 
to bridge the explanatory gap by using the tools we have invented over 
time. The interesting part is how the gap can be closed, although we 
normally cannot do it. Different sensory organs can be partially bridged 
by "goggles" like night night-vision goggles that extend our senses. 
Different life paths can be partially bridged by cinemas and movies 
which allow us to peek into the lives of others. Or simply by spending 
time with the person you try understand, by sharing the same path for a 
while.

Every hard philosophical problem that can be solved approximately is an 
achievement. Free will is an achievement too, as Daniel Dennett wrote. 
It remains an illusion unless you try to have it. Even then it is hard. 
The interesting part to me is how we can achieve it, and how good this 
solution is, although we normally cannot find a solution. It is also 
interesting why the explanatory gap exists - which often has 
evolutionary reasons.

Best
Jochen


On 2026-11-02 23:01, Eric Charles wrote:
Yeah.... Jochen...
I'm a bit confused by your reply as well... I am neither expressing
professional jealousy nor trying to angle for co-authorship on your
project... I'm trying to help you out here...

I'm pointing out that "The Hard Problem" is more like a Zen Koan than
a clearly-specified problem. Those who buy into "The Hard Problem"
will insist that any success you might have in "solving it" is
indicative of your not understanding it. That isn't to denigrate your
work, it is specifically to address any expectation you might have
that when you are done someone, anyone, might agree that you have
"solved The Hard Problem." That's just not how the weird
socio-cultural game surrounding that "problem" works.

IF you want to try to formalize our discussions of psychological
phenomenon, there are two reasonable ways approaches to The Hard
Problem: 1) Decide the "The Hard Problem" is legitimately pointing out
aspects of our experience about which we cannot speak sensibly... and
then really and truly let that stand... not trying to speak beyond
perhaps trying to demarcate the border, on the other side of which you
let silence reign. 2) Decide that there are only things about which we
can speak... and thereby fundamentally reject "The Hard Problem."

As such: If you are trying to formalize psychology, and you think you
can provide words and formulae to talk meaningfully about everything
in that domain, i.e., if _you _think the domain contains only things
that words and formulae are capable of getting at, then _you _are
rejecting The Hard Problem.

Of course, as Dave and Glen and others point out, there is no need to
care about any of this at all if formalizing (to whatever extent)
isn't your goal. Zen Koans aren't useless. Questions that ultimately
don't make sense can still transform our lives in meaningful ways, and
the world is often made better by virtue of containing people who
contemplate such questions. It may also be possible to get at things
artistically (poetically, musically, etc.) that cannot be gotten at
with formal systems of words and equations; that is a different
discussion.

Formal systems have limits created by the fact of their formality, and
some people believe there are things that exist fundamentally beyond
the limitations of any such systems. The Hard Problem is a postulation
of exactly the latter sort of things. As a result: You may find
benefit in working on The Hard Problem, but what you can't find is "a
solution", because it is crucial to the premise that no solution can
work.

Best,
Eric

On Mon, Nov 2, 2026 at 1:35 PM glen <g...@ropella.name> wrote:

FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your
language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless
for talking about that target."

The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can*
express anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without
nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the
*language* that forces those outcomes but the inferential system to
which the language is bound. Most people in my network are very
metaphorical thinkers, which allows them to slip and slide all over
the place when they hear/read an expression whose bindings are
ambiguous or unregistered. More literal thinkers like me aren't
incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we tend to resist it,
complain when we spot unregistered slippage.

More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips"
a suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens
come in, setting the context. Those in this class who are
charitable, either ask you helpful questions to choose which
inferential system to bind to. Uncharitable ones (e.g.
Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they feel like their
time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in the
blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts
yelling RTFM at me. 8^D

But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the
inferential system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud
Jochen's attempt(s) to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν
ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα
σώσω."

[⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something
rather than nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's
charitability. E.g. Sean Carroll is very charitable
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm not. To me, it's a nonsense
question and demonstrates the extent to which the asker is confused.
But you can *still* express it. And if you're amongst a crowd of
charitable people, especially if they're cognitively endowed, tokens
like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right
inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss?
8^D

On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote:
I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery??
successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about
Wittgenstein.

Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to
misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he
merely said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a
language that has been formally defined to exclude expressions of
that thing.

Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game
with strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game
that is contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make
the play.

If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its
core, there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of
psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules,
expressible in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or
"non-truth."

A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in
English is necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word
makes it "Something."

Wittgenstein never said, "shut up."

davew


On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, j...@cas-group.net wrote:
Eric,

I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is
that
behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that
someone
else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been
waiting
patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor
at an
university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was
and is
not my intention.

My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than
yours.
For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the
cinemas
I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological
residue.
This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our
new AI
friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node
bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together
if it
looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas
and
write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
Group
solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you
to
get
that academic position too.


https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf

Best wishes,
Jochen

On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote:
As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book
(the one
I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation
in
Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated
drafts to
some readers... so if any of you are interested....

This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question
here:


Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers,
“Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man
schweigen,”
which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak,
one
must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate
that we
should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding
the
mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime
example of
that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is
true,
either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then
your
“feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something
that
exists only in your mental space, that only you could access,
and my
“feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something
that
exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And
_if_
that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such
things all
we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about
them
sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments
demonstrated
this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in
combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many
people
have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering
proof
that a science of psychology is impossible.

However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we
do
not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we
understand
his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of
psychology:
Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the
phenomena
they are discussing are, inherently, an example of
that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are
discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak
about
sensibly.

We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person
deeply
interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the
scrutinizing
you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that
cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to
deal
with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that
situation, and
then you should try to find other things to be interested in.
We,
however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological
phenomena
are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and
we
have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in
practice. We
believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand
psychological terms that is fundamentally different than
Lavoisier’s
attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be
right or
wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways
that can
be readily corrected over time… because the things we are
talking
about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital
essence, or
other mystical factors having been included.

We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things
that
_can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied.
They are
aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be
recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately
and
explained well.

Best,
Eric

On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <j...@cas-group.net> wrote:

If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the
rest.
What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak,
thereof
one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety,
pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective
experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot
be
meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I
see it
differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never
understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the
depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that
substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just
linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.

For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the
interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages,
theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for
pain is
as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the
agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts".
If we
describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal
by
definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to
feel
pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for
instance we
can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most
of
us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or
horse
ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which
looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ).

This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the
film
maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema
conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and
they
are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead
actor
because they see and hear what it goes through and they know
what it
feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According
to
Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must
remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know
what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the
hard
problem.

-J.

On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of
pain.
And
…

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen

You just cannot have it both ways.

N

Sent from my Dumb Phone

On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, j...@cas-group.net wrote:

Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini
created.
And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I
asked
Claude
and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I
asked
them
if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience
-
gauge
invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for
subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was
able
to
formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs
which
have different personalities often gives better results than
just
using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate
and
precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field
theory
of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics,
but
the
physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also
understand only half of it.

I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named
the
same,
only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing
than
the
old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the
appendix
with
this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem
looks
similar to this - in combination with the other things written
in
the
rest of the book.

https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf

Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some
researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for
example
wrote
he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as
regulations. In
a
post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my
behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of
various
sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”,
has
been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can
be
found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is
a
kind
of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of
it
but
for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what
it
feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it
does
not
scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the
animal
well
you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for
example
by
the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain
just as
intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th
eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we
still
eat
pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We
Love
Dogs,
Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?

-J.

--
8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα
σώσω.

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