Karen,

I figure that the picture painted is somewhat close to reality. John
Zoghby is a Palestinian/American and fairly responsible. He is also a
pollster who speaks Arabic and would understand the sampling frame needed
and the types of sampling errors that would be prone to occur. I used to
know his brother quite well [Jamal/James] and have met and talked with
John.

Bill

On Tue, 23 Sep 2003 11:38:29 -0700 "Karen Watters Cole"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Harry, this is indeed interesting.  But given it comes from American
> Enterprise Institute, even the Zogby name attached to it becomes 
> suspect. If
> the WSJ had partnered with the Wilson Institute, for example, it 
> would
> present a more balanced inclination.  Since Bush2 desperately needs 
> good
> news from Iraq, skeptics must exercise the eyebrow here and hold 
> this at
> length for awhile.
> 
> David Brooks wrote in sympathy to this idea, however, in today's 
> NYT, also
> citing the Zogby poll.  See Caught in the Iraqi Dramatics @
> http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/23/opinion/23BROO.html?hp
> 
> Much remains to be done; all is not lost, except for America's 
> credibility
> and two generations' worth of savings and hard work down the drain.  
> As has
> been said, the other night when the President spoke to the nation 
> and
> attached an $87 Billion price tag to the misadventures in the 
> desert, those
> who will be paying for it had already been sent to bed by their 
> parents.
> 
> Adding insult to injury, by obligating ourselves to this misbegotten 
> foreign
> policy whirlpool, we will lose debt reduction momentum, fall further 
> behind
> on our own infrastructure needs, including education investments in 
> K-12 and
> college. The cost of war in not being able to address the real and 
> future
> problems at home?  Priceless.  We can not do this alone, it is 
> foolish to
> try to do so.  Yet, witness today's events.
> 
> I'm going to rant here.  If Bush had instead addressed himself 
> seriously to
> the problems in Israel and Palestine after 9/11 instead of fools 
> gold in
> Baghdad, there might have been more progress towards lasting peace 
> there and
> defused anti-Americanism in the Middle East.  What was the harm in 
> trying?
> But that is not what the Oil Aristocracy and Christian Zionists 
> embedded in
> Bush2 want, a lasting solution of peace in Israel.  The CZ's don't 
> want a
> truce or peace, they want a complete conquest by Israel so that the 
> Second
> Coming can happen, and the Likudists are glad to oblige them in 
> this
> zealotry.  The Oil Aristocracy wants full control of the Iraq 
> region, or as
> others have said, exercising "compassionate colonization".  In the 
> meantime,
> let the military industrial complex thrive with our 
> technological-weaponry
> links to Israel since we have been investing in their economy 
> forever.
> 
> Here are a few items to consider from something I posted elsewhere a 
> few
> weeks ago:
> 
> The Wall Street Journal joins the NYT and other major newspapers 
> presenting
> the details that the public has the right to know.  It's about 
> time.
>  Transcribed from The Oregonian, News Focus page A6, September 10, 
> 2003:
> 
> Adding up the costs of the Iraq war
> 
> Military operations: $65.5 billion which includes: 
>         Comparisons
> $51 B for Iraq, $11 B for Afghanistan, including:        Within the 
> federal budget
> the $87 B is equivalent to:
> $32.3 B for "operating tempo" or the pace of the operation in terms 
> of
> equipment usage        4 % of the proposed budget for the 2004 FY
> $18.5 B in military personnel costs        11 % of proposed 
> discretionary spending
> $1.9 B for new and replacement equipment        20 % of nonmilitary 
> discretionary
> spending
> Iraq reconstruction: $20.3 Billion        163 % of discretionary 
> spending on
> education
> $5 B for security, including:
> $2.1 B for the new Iraqi army and civilian defense 
> corps        Other wars and
> post-conflict efforts:*
> $2.1 B for border enforcement, police, fire and 
> customs        Marshall Plan: $100
> billion
> $15 B for infrastructure, including:        Postwar Japan: $19 
> billion
> $6.0 B for electric power        World War 2: $4.9 trillion
> $3.7 B for water and sewage        Vietnam: $600 billion
> $2.1 B for oil        1991 Persian Gulf War: $84 billion
> $800 M for transportation and communications                         
>    US share:
> $6.4 billion
> $500 M for housing, public buildings, roads and 
> bridges        Kosovo (to date): $9
> billion
> Afghanistan reconstruction: $800 million
> * Figures are approximate and adjusted for inflation.[PARA]Sources: 
> White
> House, Congressional Research Service, Coalition Provision Authority 
> and
> Defense Dept documents provided by congressional sources.
>                                                                        
New 
> York Times News Service
> 
> Paying the bills:
> Some of the monthly costs of peacekeeping, rebuilding and running 
> Iraq, in
> millions of dollars*
> 
> Keeping 129,000 troops in Iraq        $3,900
> Food aid        $200
> Iraqi salaries and pensions        $190
> Operations of Iraq's ministries        $143
> Oil-field work        $141
> Capital improvements of Iraq's ministries        $101
> US-funded contractors        $100
> * Figures are for 2003 only and include funds from US 
> appropriations, Iraqi
> oil reserve and seized assets.
> Sources: Pentagon,  Coalition Provisional Authority, The Wall Street 
> Journal
> 
> Oil Reserves: forecasts were based on conservative exports, prices
> Salem Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council's finance 
> committee,
> says the pessimistic formulations for oil revenue now expressed by 
> Iraqi
> officials in Baghdad are based on conservative assumptions about 
> export
> levels and prices.
> The officials say revenue could amount to as little as $7B instead 
> of the
> $12B to $14B hoped for by some in the US coalition. Meanwhile, Iraq 
> could
> need as much as $20B for reconstruction.
> Coalition officials continue to struggle to boost Iraq's oil 
> exports, its
> only real domestic source of revenue.  But despite progress this 
> summer,
> Iraqi and American engineers are still well behind meeting 
> expectations
> raised immediately after the war.  At current export rates, Iraq may 
> have
> trouble making forecast oil revenue of some $3.45B for the second 
> half of
> this year.
> Current production capacity stands at about 1.8 million barrels a 
> day, down
> from about 2.5 million before the war.  With domestic consumption at 
> about
> 500,000 barrels a day, about 1.3 million barrels should be available 
> for
> export each day.  But the pipeline in Iraq's northern fields, which 
> pumped
> about 40% of the country's oil before the war, has bottled up output 
> there.
> Meanwhile, erratic power has showed exports from Iraq's southern 
> fields in
> recent weeks.
> Things have improved since earlier this summer, when exports were
> essentially nonexistent.  In August, initial data suggested exports 
> of as
> much as 600,000 to 800,000 barrels a day.  But to make the high end 
> of
> coalition estimates for oil revenue in 2004, Iraq will have to boost 
> average
> exports for the year to 1.5 million barrels a day and realize an 
> optimistic
> price of $25 a barrel.  Most analysts expect crude oil prices to 
> fall from
> currently lofty levels near $30 a barrel, especially if Iraq 
> increases
> output.
> That sort of export level appears difficult to achieve, especially 
> after
> recent attacks against the oil infrastructure.  A large explosion 
> ripped
> through a crucial pipeline that links Iraq's northern fields with 
> the
> Mediterranean just days after the line started pumping again. Other
> explosions along the pipeline, all blamed on sabotage, have clouded 
> repair
> estimates.
> The Pentagon already has spent about $705 million on oil field 
> repairs, part
> of $1.14 billion committ4ed through March.  The US point man for 
> Iraqi oil,
> Philip Carroll, said final costs could be higher.  "I'm not going to 
> be
> surprised if there's some creep," Carroll said in a recent 
> interview.
> Just keeping oil field going is expensive.  One extensive report 
> prepared
> before the war estimated the Iraqi Oil Ministry's annual expenses, 
> including
> maintenance, operating costs and administrative overhead, could 
> total about
> $3B a year.
> Even with optimistic forecasts, expected oil revenue won't be able 
> to cover
> these costs and other larger reconstruction commitments at the same 
> time,
> analysts warn. - The Wall Street Journal
> 
> See Costs of War @ http://www.costofwar.com/
> See Congressional Quarterly @  www.cq.com for growing lack of 
> support by GOP
> lawmakers for the Iraq war
> 
> WHAT IRAQIS REALLY THINK
> By Karl Zinsmeister
> 
> ARTICLES - Wall Street Journal, Publication Date: September 10, 
> 2003
> 
> 
> America, some say, is hobbled in its policies toward Iraq by not 
> knowing
> much about what Iraqis really think. Are they on the side of 
> radical
> Islamists? What kind of government would they like? What is their 
> attitude
> toward the U.S.? Do the Shiites hate us? Could Iraq become another 
> Iran
> under the ayatollahs? Are the people in the Sunni triangle the real 
> problem?
> 
> Up to now we've only been able to guess. We've relied on anecdotal
> temperature-takings of the Iraqi public, and have been at the mercy 
> of
> images presented to us by the press. We all know that journalists 
> have a
> bad-news bias: 10,000 schools being rehabbed isn't news; one school 
> blowing
> up is a weeklong feeding frenzy. And some of us who have spent time
> recently in Iraq--I was an embedded reporter during the war--have 
> been
> puzzled by the postwar news and media imagery, which is much more 
> negative
> than what many individuals involved in reconstructing Iraq have 
> been
> telling us.
> 
> Well, finally we have some evidence of where the truth may lie. 
> Working
> with Zogby International survey researchers, The American 
> Enterprise
> magazine has conducted the first scientific poll of the Iraqi 
> public. Given
> the state of the country, this was not easy. Security problems 
> delayed our
> intrepid fieldworkers several times. We labored at careful 
> translations,
> regional samplings and survey methods to make sure our results 
> would
> accurately reflect the views of Iraq's multifarious, long-suffering 
> people.
> We consulted Eastern European pollsters about the best way to elicit 
> honest
> answers from those conditioned to repress their true sentiments.
> 
> Conducted in August, our survey was necessarily limited in scope, 
> but it
> reflects a nationally representative sample of Iraqi views, as 
> captured in
> four disparate cities: Basra (Iraq's second largest, home to 1.7 
> million
> people, in the far south), Mosul (third largest, far north), Kirkuk
> (Kurdish-influenced oil city, fourth largest) and Ramadi (a 
> resistance
> hotbed in the Sunni triangle). The results show that the Iraqi 
> public is
> more sensible, stable and moderate than commonly portrayed, and that 
> Iraq
> is not so fanatical, or resentful of the U.S., after all.
> Iraqis are optimistic. Seven out of 10 say they expect their country 
> and
> their personal lives will be better five years from now. On both 
> fronts, 32
> percent say things will become much better.
> 
> The toughest part of reconstructing their nation, Iraqis say by 3 to 
> 1,
> will be politics, not economics. They are nervous about democracy. 
> Asked
> which is closer to their own view--"Democracy can work well in 
> Iraq," or
> "Democracy is a Western way of doing things"--five out of 10 said 
> democracy
> is Western and won't work in Iraq. One in 10 wasn't sure. And four 
> out of
> 10 said democracy can work in Iraq. There were interesting 
> divergences.
> Sunnis were negative on democracy by more than 2 to 1; but, 
> critically, the
> majority Shiites were as likely to say democracy would work for 
> Iraqis as
> not. People age 18-29 are much more rosy about democracy than other 
> Iraqis,
> and women are significantly more positive than men.
> 
> Asked to name one country they would most like Iraq to model its 
> new
> government on from five possibilities--neighboring, Baathist Syria;
> neighbor and Islamic monarchy Saudi Arabia; neighbor and Islamist 
> republic
> Iran; Arab lodestar Egypt; or the U.S.--the most popular model by 
> far was
> the U.S. The U.S. was preferred as a model by 37 percent of Iraqis
> selecting from those five--more than Syria, Iran and Egypt put 
> together.
> Saudi Arabia was in second place at 28 percent. Again, there were 
> important
> demographic splits. Younger adults are especially favorable toward 
> the
> U.S., and Shiites are more admiring than Sunnis. Interestingly, 
> Iraqi
> Shiites, coreligionists with Iranians, do not admire Iran's 
> Islamist
> government; the U.S. is six times as popular with them as a model 
> for
> governance.
> 
> Our interviewers inquired whether Iraq should have an Islamic 
> government,
> or instead let all people practice their own religion. Only 33 
> percent want
> an Islamic government; a solid 60 percent say no. A vital detail: 
> Shiites
> (whom Western reporters frequently portray as self-flagellating 
> maniacs)
> are least receptive to the idea of an Islamic government, saying no 
> by 66
> percent to 27 percent. It is only among the minority Sunnis that 
> there is
> interest in a religious state, and they are split evenly on the 
> question.
> 
> Perhaps the strongest indication that an Islamic government won't be 
> part
> of Iraq's future: The nation is thoroughly secularized. We asked how 
> often
> our respondents had attended the Friday prayer over the previous 
> month.
> Fully 43 percent said "never." It's time to scratch "Khomeini II" 
> from the
> list of morbid fears.
> 
> You can also cross out "Osama II": 57 percent of Iraqis with an 
> opinion
> have an unfavorable view of Osama bin Laden, with 41 percent of 
> those
> saying it is a very unfavorable view. (Women are especially down on 
> him.)
> Except in the Sunni triangle (where the limited support that exists 
> for bin
> Laden is heavily concentrated), negative views of the al Qaeda 
> supremo are
> actually quite lopsided in all parts of the country. And those 
> opinions
> were collected before Iraqi police announced it was al Qaeda members 
> who
> killed worshipers with a truck bomb in Najaf.
> 
> And you can write off the possibility of a Baath revival. We asked 
> "Should
> Baath Party leaders who committed crimes in the past be punished, or 
> should
> past actions be put behind us?" A thoroughly unforgiving Iraqi 
> public
> stated by 74 percent to 18 percent that Saddam's henchmen should be
> punished.
> 
> This new evidence on Iraqi opinion suggests the country is 
> manageable. If
> the small number of militants conducting sabotage and murder inside 
> the
> country can gradually be eliminated by American troops (this is 
> already
> happening), then the mass of citizens living along the 
> Tigris-Euphrates
> Valley are likely to make reasonably sensible use of their new 
> freedom. "We
> will not forget it was the U.S. soldiers who liberated us from 
> Saddam,"
> said Abid Ali, an auto repair shop owner in Sadr City last 
> month--and our
> research shows that he's not unrepresentative.
> 
> None of this is to suggest that the task ahead will be simple. 
> Inchoate
> anxiety toward the U.S. showed up when we asked Iraqis if they 
> thought the
> U.S. would help or hurt Iraq over a five-year period. By 50 percent 
> to 36
> percent they chose hurt over help. This is fairly understandable; 
> Iraqis
> have just lived through a war in which Americans were (necessarily)
> flinging most of the ammunition. These experiences may explain why 
> women
> (who are more antimilitary in all cultures) show up in our data as
> especially wary of the U.S. right now. War is never pleasant, though 
> U.S.
> forces made heroic efforts to spare innocents in this one, as I 
> illustrate
> with firsthand examples in my book about the battles.
> 
> Evidence of the comparative gentleness of this war can be seen in 
> our poll.
> Less than 30 percent of our sample of Iraqis knew or heard of anyone 
> killed
> in the spring fighting. Meanwhile, fully half knew some family 
> member,
> neighbor or friend who had been killed by Iraqi security forces 
> during the
> years Saddam held power.
> 
> Perhaps the ultimate indication of how comfortable Iraqis are with
> America's aims in their region came when we asked how long they 
> would like
> to see American and British forces remain in their country: Six 
> months? One
> year? Two years or more? Two thirds of those with an opinion urged 
> that the
> coalition troops should stick around for at least another year.
> 
> We're making headway in a benighted part of the world. Hang in 
> there,
> America.
> 
> Karl Zinsmeister is editor in chief of The American Enterprise 
> magazine and
> holder of the J.B. Fuqua chair at the American Enterprise 
> Institute.
> 
> 
> 
> 
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