On 17/12/11 13:40, Jerome Baum wrote: >> The system can be easily abused, therefore it will be abused. It's just >> a matter of time. How much time, depends on if/when PGP becomes more >> popular. It doesn't strike me as unreasonable to want to put defences in >> place before an attack begins. > > Just like you shouldn't write blatantly inefficient code. But there's > also a point after which we call this premature optimization. Ditto for > putting up security measures for a problem that may well never become one.
So you agree that there is a point where putting security measures in place is a good idea. Where you disagree with me, is you think it is unlikely that the keyservers will be abused in this manner in the near future. I guess neither of us can see into the future, but the prevalence of this sort of abuse on the Internet, always places me on the side of caution. > I would be very happy to see this become a problem in fact. It would > imply that OpenPGP is popular enough to attract script kiddies & co. It would only take one troll. -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc Professional http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell PGP.mit.edu 0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F
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