I would say you failed.
I'm not trying to convince you. I'm revealing to the world you might not be someone worth taking cryptographic engineering advice from.
You still haven't shown the scheme to be less secure than the strongest mechanism.
Correct. I have, however, put out a single genuine question which you need to be able to answer before I'll take your idea seriously: "does your proposal form a group?" Answer with mathematical rigor and we can keep talking.
It is an interesting result you are proposing that I could download an encrypted file from you, and without knowing what keys you used: encrypt it a second time in order to weaken the security of that payload.
That is, in fact, a possibility. It's one we wish to avoid. This is why I ask, "does your proposal form a group?"
NSA isn't expecting it'll be available to their enemies until 2055. Add fifteen years to that and you're projecting out to 2070.That may end up being an overly optimistic scenario.
On the one hand there's the United States National Security Agency, the world's largest employer of cryptographers and cryptographic engineers, who have a multibillion-dollar research budget, who have a very real interest in producing sound information security policies to keep their 25-year secrets safe from some of the most cunning, underhanded, well- equipped, well-funded, and smartest adversaries in the world -- And on the other hand there's Jay from the internet saying large quantum computers could appear 30 years earlier than NSA's projections. Does your proposal form a group?
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