> 'The system spawns a virtual instance of the app - or at least allows > mapping a single datastore partition to the authenticated entity. You > coudl extend it by allowing multiple datastores per authenticated > entity and choosing the appropriate one at authentication time.' > > I haven't mentioned application code at all. If you have interpreted > 'the system'' to mean my application code, then I think you are being > disingenuous.
"The system" in this case is the combination of the GAE platform and an application running on said platform. > What's the point of a feature request for my own application code? Oh really? The reason that this requires a feature request is that it isn't (currently) possible for an application running on GAE to request the creation of another datastore. (One could call an outside agent to request another application, but ....) > Do you support request 106? Yes. > Do you oppose 945? Not sure. > At the moment, I am getting the idea you support 106, > but not the implication that it would support queries across > datastores. 106 allows an application to access multiple datastores, so why would I think that it doesn't? Note that the ability of an application to access multiple datastores does not imply the ability to access arbitrary datastores. Note also that the ability to access multiple datastores could be satisfied via a "datastore login" API used by the application which would be as secure as anything by the platform before the application starts. (Both schemes can be exploited by malicious code. Both are only as secure as the platform's login.) > I am also understanding that you oppose the data > segregation from 945 because you think it doesn't serve a purpose. I'm skeptical of 945 because it's a lot of mechanism. There are many ways to get data segregation using the existing partitioning. > This is despite the fact that the entire security architecture of GAE > is based on trustable external authentication, data partitioning, > mapping that data partition to the authenticated entity, and not > allowing cross data store queries. The GAE security architecture is not based on "not allowing cross data store queries". It's based on authenticated access to partitioned datastores, which is a very different thing. One could have authenticated access to partitioned datastores AND cross datastore queries. One could have authenticated access to choice of partitioned datastore but not have cross datastore queries. One have authenticated access to choice of partitioned datastores and allow cross datastore queries. One could even have an "authenticated choice" mechanism that allowed cross datastore queries for some datastores and not others. > Are you saying the current GAE security architecture is wrong? No. > Or just that they should get rid of the data partitioning to deliver feature > 106? No. On Dec 26, 5:50 am, hawkett <hawk...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Huh? You were requesting the ability to spawn a new datastore and to > > have the login scheme for a given pile of application code pick the > > datastore. The above is about methods for separating datastores and > > whether the method for separating them should depend on how the > > datastore is chose > > I assume you are talking about this statement from my first post? - > > 'The system spawns a virtual instance of the app - or at least allows > mapping a single datastore partition to the authenticated entity. You > coudl extend it by allowing multiple datastores per authenticated > entity and choosing the appropriate one at authentication time.' > > I haven't mentioned application code at all. If you have interpreted > 'the system'' to mean my application code, then I think you are being > disingenuous. What's the point of a feature request for my own > application code? The feature request has the term 'data segregation' > in its title, and doesn't include the proposed extension (as this > would add significant additional complexity). Anyway, when I request > functionality in 'the system' in a GAE feature request, I am talking > about GAE, not my own application code. If you're talking about some > other statement I made, then please say what it is. > > > With no post-login check, the application runs using whatever > > datastore the login procedure finds acceptable. > > Yes, it does. This is not our application code, and we trust it. If > you don't trust it, modify it or choose a different authentication > mechanism that you do trust. > > > If the login > > procedure fails or the datastore layer serves up the wrong datastore, > > the application still does its thing. > > Raise and fix the bug in the authentication/db layer. > > What is your actual position Andy? Do you support request 106? Do > you oppose 945? At the moment, I am getting the idea you support 106, > but not the implication that it would support queries across > datastores. I am also understanding that you oppose the data > segregation from 945 because you think it doesn't serve a purpose. > This is despite the fact that the entire security architecture of GAE > is based on trustable external authentication, data partitioning, > mapping that data partition to the authenticated entity, and not > allowing cross data store queries. Are you saying the current GAE > security architecture is wrong? Or just that they should get rid of > the data partitioning to deliver feature 106? If this is your > position, then it seems totally unsustainable to me. > > On Dec 24, 11:45 pm, Andy Freeman <ana...@earthlink.net> wrote: > > > > > >> You're hoping that the partitioning for a given datastore depends on > > >> how google allows access to said datastore > > > Exactly - that is the feature request I am proposing. > > > Huh? You were requesting the ability to spawn a new datastore and to > > have the login scheme for a given pile of application code pick the > > datastore. The above is about methods for separating datastores and > > whether the method for separating them should depend on how the > > datastore is chosen. > > > > I don't agree. You should trust your authentication mechanism - this > > > is a trust relationship. If you don't trust it, then you need to > > > address that problem, not write additional application code which adds > > > to the complexity of your security implementation. Complexity in your > > > security implementation increases risk, not decreases it. Note this > > > is not an argument against defense in depth - it is an argument for > > > simplicity in each implementation layer. > > > Let's look at these alternatives. > > > With no post-login check, the application runs using whatever > > datastore the login procedure finds acceptable. If the login > > procedure fails or the datastore layer serves up the wrong datastore, > > the application still does its thing. > > > Post-validate may catch either of those errors. (Of course, the post- > > validate could fail as well and allow access when it shouldn't, but > > that just leaves you no worse off than you were without the check.) > > Yes, the post-validate may block execution when it shouldn't, but > > that's likely to be because the datastore layer is misbehaving, > > delivering wrong data. The application may have failed eventually > > anyway when running with a misbehaving datastore layer, but detection > > during validation is better because the application doesn't get a > > chance to corrupt user-data. > > > On Dec 24, 10:17 am, hawkett <hawk...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > You're hoping that the partitioning for a given datastore depends on > > > > how google allows access to said datastore > > > > Exactly - that is the feature request I am proposing. It seems > > > likely to me that GAE uses a data partitioning feature of BigTable > > > (maybe not, I don't know, but to me it seems the right place to > > > implement a data partitioning function) - they should expand the way > > > GAE uses that BigTable feature to offer the functionality I am > > > requesting. > > > > > If your customers are serious, they must, regardless of how your > > > > application is deployed, regardless of who handles login/access > > > > management. Login code isn't the only risk. > > > > Perhaps, but the threshold is significantly lowered - customers are > > > more likely to undertake an audit (rather than go to a competitor) if > > > they can see you are using platform features for security - I stand by > > > the assertion that 100% of customers who engage you for the first time > > > will prefer you to be using the platform over custom application code > > > - especially for security. > > > > > And, if you're serious about login code, you must validate the login > > > > result. That is, once it is determined that a given user running your > > > > application should use a given datastore, the application then must > > > > look the datastore that it is trying to use and verify that it is > > > > actually the correct datastore for that user > > > > I don't agree. You should trust your authentication mechanism - this > > > is a trust relationship. If you don't trust it, then you need to > > > address that problem, not write additional application code which adds > > > to the complexity of your security implementation. Complexity in your > > > security implementation increases risk, not decreases it. Note this > > > is not an argument against defense in depth - it is an argument for > > > simplicity in each implementation layer. We are talking about the > > > authentication layer, and the db access layer, and both should be > > > platform concerns, not application concerns (at least from my > > > perspective) - certainly they are currently platform concerns in GAE, > > > and I would like them to stay that way. > > > > It is very important to note that the functionality is *nearly* there > > > already - i.e. restricting access to users from a google apps account > > > - it has strict data partitioning, authentication and db access are > > > platform concerns, user provisioning administration etc. is already > > > there in google apps. The only thing missing is a method of > > > automatically spawning a new application in response to a customer > > > registration (and the 10 app limit). > > > > The architecture of GAE right now is totally in line with what I am > > > talking about, and I have no doubt that this is for all the reasons I > > > have listed, and many I haven't even thought of. Consequently I doubt > > > that you will ever be given the functionality you are looking for - > > > i.e. accessing multiple datastores from the same application instance. > > > > I'll ask again - would a feature that allowed you to map the same > > > datastore to multiple application instances satisfy your use-case? It > > > does stretch the data partitioning thing a bit, but might be workable > > > from a platform configuration perspective. > > > > On Dec 23, 7:22 pm, Andy Freeman <ana...@earthlink.net> wrote: > > > > > > In fact, given that Google already > > > > > have a data partitioning mechanism for applications, I wouldn't be > > > > > surprised if it was even lower level than the GAE platform, and part > > > > > of the BigTable implementation. > > > > > You're hoping that the partitioning for a given datastore depends on > > > > how google allows access to said datastore. In particular, you're > > > > hoping that the partitioning for datastores using a feature where a > > > > given application can pick between a set of datastores is different > > > > than the partitioning when a given application has access to exactly > > > > one datastore. > > > > > That's unlikely. If google decides to implement such a feature, it > > > > would be silly to also introduce a different mechanism for > > > > partitioning datastores. > > > > > > How would they even begin to assess the risk profile - do > > > > > they have to audit your company's development practices? > > > > > If your customers are serious, they must, regardless of how your > > > > application is deployed, regardless of who handles login/access > > > > management. Login code isn't the only risk. > > > > > And, if you're serious about login code, you must validate the login > > > > result. That is, once it is determined that a given user running your > > > > application should use a given datastore, the application then must > > > > look the datastore that it is trying to use and verify that it is > > > > actually the correct datastore for that user. Platform login code > > > > can't do that check. And, the platform's login doesn't provide much > > > > information to the application for it to do such a check. > > > > > Yes, I realize that customers have different risk and cost > > > > sensitivities so there must be some right around the points that you > > > > like. However, that's a long way from saying that such points > > > > dominate. > > > > > On Dec 22, 2:03 pm, hawkett <hawk...@gmail.com> wrote: > > ... > > read more »- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Google App Engine" group. 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