On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow < christopher.mor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > There MAY be MiTM problems, but one argument is that there are > whenever a packet crosses out of your administrative control. I don't > know that the hyperbolic argument (everything is a mitm chance!) is > helpful here, so I'd skip that. I would say that there are certainly > cases where a well planned leak can cause traffic inspection to be > possible (and MiTM) where the network operators were previously > unaware of such hazards. > I would agree that focusing on MiTM attacks is hyperbolic and that the more frequent consequence has been blackholing or (extreme) packet loss due to congestion. Also it's worthy to note that the leaks with naive causes (vs. malicious) have been more common by far. (And would second that Shane's contact info needs updating, esp. since I think the Auth48 check before publication will go quicker with it.) Thanks, Tony > The draft with it's current goal, I think, is easily summed up by: > "If you don't police the routes in/out of your network bad things > could happen. BGPSEC/RPKI do not inherently police the routes in/out > of your network." > > so in like 2 sentences the point made by the authors is clear... Still > no definition of 'route leak' though. > > -chris >
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