Hi,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dale W. Carder <dwcar...@es.net>
> Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2023 11:28 PM
> To: gengnan <geng...@huawei.com>
> Cc: Job Snijders <j...@fastly.com>; grow@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [GROW] Working Group Call for draft-fiebig-grow-bgpopsecupd
> (start 06/Dec/2023 end 06/Jan/2024)
> 
> Thus spake gengnan (gengnan=40huawei....@dmarc.ietf.org) on Tue, Dec 12,
> 2023 at 09:30:06AM +0000:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I support the adoption of the draft. Some comments that may need to be
> considered:
> >
> > 1. The draft was proposed to GROW WG, but the wg info on the top of the
> first page of the draft is opsec.
> >
> > 2. The meanings of "upstream" in this draft and the ASPA draft are 
> > different.
> According to the term definition in this draft, the ASPA upstream verification
> should be conducted for the routes from *downstream* or peer.
> > In section 3: "
> > Upstream:
> >       In a direct relationship between two ASes the one providing
> >       upstream to the other.  (See: [RFC9234], also known as the
> >       provider in a customer-provider relationship.) "
> > In section 7.2.2: "
> > In [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification], see following sections based
> >    on the neighbor relationship:
> >
> >    *  Section 6.1 for routes received from upstreams and lateral peers.
> >
> >    *  Section 6.2 for routes received from downstreams and mutual-
> >       transits.
> > "
> >
> > 3. The term "Mutual Upstream" is not used. It should be "mutual transit" or
> "sibling". Also, some terms should be unified, e.g., "upstream" "upstream
> provider"; "Internet peer" "lateral peer" "peer"; etc.
> >
> > 4. In my understanding, some recommended operations have overlapped
> protections/functions. For example, both OTC RFC 9234 and RPKI-ASPA can
> detect route leaks. Should an operator deploy both techniques or just one of
> them (under which conditions)?
> 
> Both!  See section 7.2 of draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification
> 
>    While the ASPA-based AS_PATH verification method (Section 7.1)
>    detects and mitigates route leaks that were created by preceding ASes
>    listed in the AS_PATH, it lacks the ability to prevent route leaks
>    from occuring at the local AS.  The use of the Only to Customer (OTC)
>    Attribute [RFC9234] fills in that gap.
> 

Thanks. I'd like to say (out of the scope of the draft): it would be better if 
one kind of problems can be solved by one technique. But here it seems that two 
techniques are needed for complete protection. 

> 
> Dale

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