Hi authors,

I welcome the work in this document to update the BCPs and improve the status 
quo.

May I suggest a few additions to the document (or ask if you have considered 
these already)?

* Don't send or accept internal or deprecated attributes unless explicitly 
agreed - An example of a fully internal attribute is D-PATH, this should never 
be seen in the DFZ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10039/). One can see all 
IANA deprecated attributes here: 
https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters. I don't think blocking all 
attributes except for an approved list, or blocking unknown attributes is 
helpful, that makes addition of new attributes a pain. Instead, just block what 
should _never_ be in the DFZ. We see that some of our downstream customers 
receive these attributes and their BGP daemon dies because they are using the 
same internal attribute and it somehow doesn't make sense in the context it was 
received from their transit provider. Or they try to process deprecated 
attributes. Having reached out to some originating networks in the past to try 
and get them removed, they don't, so I think that unless we block them they 
will continue to linger.

* Don't send or accept extended communities unless explicitly agreed - some 
networks with older equipment use extended communities because they didn't 
support large communities around the time standard communities no longer became 
suitable (i.e. for signalling 32bit AS numbers). However, enabling the exchange 
of extended communities then leads to all manner of extended communities being 
leaked on outbound and not being filtered on ingress (route targets for 
example). It could be a security risk and is not needed now that all major BGP 
daemons support large communities.

* Don't accept paths with an AS_SET in them - they are deprecated but people 
are still originating such routes. A bit like people leaking extended 
communities and deprecated or internal attributes, they will continue to linger 
and the cause problems like not knowing which ASN to contact when there is a 
problem, problems with ROA validation, and problems with building AS path 
filters.

* Maybe add something about enforcing first hop AS (when not peering with an 
IXP route server)?

If you've had any thoughts about these things already I'm interested to hear 
them.

Thank you,
James.

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