Phil

The STIG does not allow a uss keystore.

ITschak

*| **Itschak Mugzach | Director | SecuriTeam Software **|** IronSphere
Platform* *|* *Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Z/OS, zLinux
and IBM I **|  *

*|* *Email**: i_mugz...@securiteam.co.il **|* *Mob**: +972 522 986404 **|*
*Skype**: ItschakMugzach **|* *Web**: www.Securiteam.co.il  **|*





בתאריך יום ד׳, 17 בינו׳ 2024 ב-22:47 מאת Phil Smith III <li...@akphs.com>:

> If you mean certificates for TLS, the USS gskkyman utility is great for
> testing/verification. Nothing wrong with it for production, but most sites
> in my experience are happier with the certs in SAF (RACF/ACF2/TSS) for
> production. The beauty of gskkyman is that it's isolated AND discrete. With
> SAF you can screw other folks up and/or think you have it working correctly
> when you don't. With gskkyman you can create a database containing just the
> certificate(s) you think you need and verify that they work, then move them
> to SAF.
>
>
>
> gskkyman operates via a series of prompts, so it's pretty easy to use:
>
> *       Get the certificate in a USS file, preferably as a Base64-encoded
> file (doesn't have to be, just easier to say "Yep, that looks like a
> certificate")
> *       Go into gskkyman and import it
> *       Point the application truststore at the gskkyman database and test
>
>
>
> Obviously I'm making a bunch of assumptions about what you're doing in the
> above, so none of it may apply.
>
>
>
> ...phsiii
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions,
> send email to lists...@listserv.ua.edu with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------
For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions,
send email to lists...@listserv.ua.edu with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN

Reply via email to