At a long-gone bank, we ran IBM's check processing application CPCS, which 
needed to run APF authorized. This meant that any program called by CPCS needed 
to come from an APF library. For whatever reason, CPCS invoked standard 
utilities such as DFSORT, which meant that those libraries also had to be APF 
just so the programs could be called by CPCS. 

We learned at some point about the possibility of flipping JSCBAUTH to tweak 
the APF mode. But CPCS was a multitasking application that was doing lots of 
things concurrently. There is only one JSCBAUTH flag. If turned it off for, 
say, SORT processing, we would very likely kill some other subtask that needed 
APF on. We decided that was pretty much impossible to manage. So everything 
that ran within CPCS came from an APF library. Note that individual programs do 
not need APF=1, but the library needs to be in APF list. 

.
.
J.O.Skip Robinson
Southern California Edison Company
Electric Dragon Team Paddler 
SHARE MVS Program Co-Manager
323-715-0595 Mobile
626-543-6132 Office ⇐=== NEW
robin...@sce.com


-----Original Message-----
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Steve Smith
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2017 7:29 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: (External):Re: ATTACH with RSAPF=YES

RSAPF probably shouldn't even be documented.  AFAIK, it's only purpose is to 
allow the system to support unauthorized tasks and jobs, and is used only with 
the creation of a new job-step task.  And there is no communication between the 
initiator task and the user task.

Authorized programs aren't allowed to invoke unauthorized code for a very good 
reason.  Trying to circumvent that in any way compromises your system 
integrity.  That said, running bad authorized code does as well, so caveat 
emptor.

sas

On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 10:16 AM, Walt Farrell <walt.farr...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Mon, 15 May 2017 15:18:38 +0700, Robin Atwood <abend...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> >We have a requirement to attach user modules from an unauthorised 
> >library and execute them from an STC which
> >
> >runs APF authorised. Calling ATTACH with RSAPF=YES seems to do 
> >exactly
> what
> >I want ...
>
> It _can_ do what you want, Robin, but as others have said it is very 
> risky to do this, and very complex to do it safely. Basically, what 
> you're trying will only work safely if your STC is designed properly 
> to allow it. At a minimum, I believe that means making sure that none 
> of your STC code runs in key 8 or uses key 8 storage. It would need to 
> start from the beginning in a system key, specified by the Program 
> Properties Table in PARMLIB. You could then, possibly, invoke the 
> non-APF code safely as long as you run it in key 8.
>
> But the question then becomes what do you expect the non-APF code to 
> do, and how do you expect to communicate with it.
>
> It really would be better and safer, in my opinion, to find another 
> solution. This might possibly involve using multiple address spaces 
> (via UNIX fork()) as John McKown suggested. But we would really need 
> to know a lot more information about your STC, and the non-APF code, 
> to be able to provide the best advice.
>
> (It is very unlikely, in my experience, that your current STC is 
> designed to allow you to do this safely. A major redesign and 
> reimplementation of the STC would probably be required if you haven't 
> been thinking about this from the very beginning of its development.)
>
> --
> Walt


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