On 12/14/22 11:10 AM, Evan Burke wrote:
It doesn't. Most of the accounts are caught before sending. All it takes is one to slip through the anti-spam detections and then go send millions of replay spam messages or more - even if that account is shut down quickly after sending.
What would happen if the ESPs DKIM implementation got, possibly a LOT, more complex in that key pairs used to sign outgoing email from clients with keys specific to each client?
That way if ~> when the ESP needed to cancel a client's service, the ESP could also withdraw the client's public key in the ESP's zone(s) thereby breaking the DKIM signature by rendering it unvalidatable. I'd think that this would largely comedown to a TTL issue on the DKIM's public key record in DNS and implementation complexity.
What am I failing to take into account? -- Grant. . . . unix || die
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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