On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 2:16 AM Alessandro Vesely <ves...@tana.it> wrote:

> On Mon 07/Aug/2023 23:52:02 +0000 Scott Kitterman wrote:
> > On Monday, August 7, 2023 7:47:47 PM EDT Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> >>
> >> I think the document does describe the attack.  An instance of the
> attack
> >> is when a replayed message lands someplace it wasn't originally
> intended to
> >> land, assuming normal usage.
>
> That's ambiguous.  Obviously, since the attack was planned, it may well be
> that the potential victims were originally intended.  The meaning is
> tweaked by the "normal usage" assumption, which could be interpreted as
> trying to pretend that the message author wasn't aware that the message
> was
> going to be replayed...?
>

I don't understand what ambiguity you're talking about.

The document lays out how the attack is accomplished.  It also indicates
that the only difference between typical DKIM operation (the original
recipient set is the only recipient set) and the attack (the final
recipient set is not the same).


> >> But my point above is simpler: "Replay Attack", when capitalized that
> way,
> >> has me going to look for a formal definition of that term someplace.
> That
> >> is, if we're going to use it that way, we should define it that way.
> So,
> >> just add it to the Glossary at least, or say in Section 1.1 that this
> term,
> >> in this document, means the attack described by that section.  Or
> something.
>
>
> Would it be enough to say "Replay Attacks are described in Section 8.6 of
> DKIM", somewhere in Section 1.1 of the I-D?
>

Sure.


> > It will be interesting to see what develops.  It's not a mystery that I'm
> > skeptical of a protocol solution to the issue.
>
> The definition cannot include a method to recognize the attack.  The I-D
> implies that attacks are being recognized (became commonplace), but omits
> the anecdotical narration of how it happens.
>

Including a sentence or two about how the attack is recognized, even
outside of the protocol, would indeed be helpful.

-MSK
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