Barry Leiba wrote:
> Description of Working Group:
>
> The Internet mail protocols and infrastructure allow mail sent
> from one domain to purport to be from another. While there are
> sometimes legitimate reasons for doing this, it has become a
> source of general confusion, as well as a mechanism for fraud and
> for distribution of spam (when done illegitimately, it's called
> "spoofing"). The DKIM working group has produced standards-track
> specifications that allow a domain to take responsibility, using
> digital signatures, for having taken part in the transmission of
> an email message and to publish "policy" information about how it
> applies those signatures. Taken together, these will assist
> receiving domains in detecting (or ruling out) certain forms of
> spoofing as it pertains to the signing domain.
I suggest replacing the last sentence with something more generic, to avoid the
debate about how much any of this pertains to spoofing, per se. Perhaps
instead
have a value proposition statement derived from the one in the Overview
abstract:
These mechanisms permit email receivers to make additional assessments
about
messages.
> While the techniques specified by the DKIM working group will not
> prevent fraud or spam, they will provide a tool for defense
> against them by assisting receiving domains in detecting some
> spoofing of known domains. The standards-track specifications do
> not mandate any particular action by the receiving domain when a
> signature fails to validate. That said, with the understanding
> that guidance is necessary for implementers, the DKIM documents
> discuss a reasonable set of possible actions and strategies, and
> analyze their likely effects on attacks and on normal email
> delivery.
Delete the first sentence, per my concern above. At the least, the sentence
appears to be largely redundant with the preceding paragraph's last sentence.
Isn't the second sentence incorrect? Doesn't DKIM mandate treated a failed
validation the same as no signature present?
>
> The previously chartered deliverables for the DKIM working group
> have been completed:
>
> * An informational RFC presenting a detailed threat analysis of,
> and security requirements for, DKIM. (RFC 4686)
>
> * A standards-track specification for DKIM signature and
> verification. (RFC 4871, updated by RFC 5672)
>
> * A standards-track specification for DKIM policy handling.
> (RFC 5617)
>
> * An informational RFC providing an overview of DKIM and how it
> can fit into overall messaging systems, how it relates to other
> IETF message signature technologies, implementation and
> migration considerations, and outlining potential DKIM
> applications and future extensions. (RFC 5585 and
> draft-ietf-dkim-deployment, in its final stages)
>
> (One previously chartered deliverable, a standards-track
> specification for DKIM DNS Resource Record(s), was dropped by
> agreement between the working group and the Area Directors.)
Do re-charters usually contain all this history?
> The working group is now ready to switch its focus to refining and
> advancing the DKIM protocols. The current deliverables for the
> DKIM working group are these:
>
> * Advance the base DKIM protocol (RFC 4871) to Draft Standard.
>
> * Collect data on the deployment and interoperability of the
> Author Domain Signing Practices protocol (RFC 5617), and
> determine if/when it's ready to advance on the standards track.
> Update it at Proposed Standard or advance it to Draft Standard,
> as appropriate.
>
> As before, several related topics remain out of scope for the DKIM
> working group. These topics include:
>
> * Reputation and accreditation systems. While we expect these to
> add value to what is defined by the DKIM working group, their
> development will be separate, and is out of scope for the DKIM
> working group.
>
> * Message content encryption.
>
> * Additional key management protocols or infrastructure.
>
> * Signatures that are intended to make long-term assertions beyond
> the expected transit time of a message from originator to
> recipient, which is normally only a matter of a few days at
> most.
>
> * Signatures that attempt to make strong assertions about the
> identity of the message author, and details of user-level
> signing of messages (as distinguished from domain-level keys
> that are restricted to specific users).
>
> * Duplication of prior work in signed email, including S/MIME and
> OpenPGP.
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
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