>> difference between a green bar SSL page and one with no SSL. I don't want >> to mess with the MUA at all, but rather use DKIM to help decide what >> messages to show her and which messages to consign to the junk folder.
>Why do we think such a sorting module can't/won't have the >intelligence to do the RFC5322 Section 3.6 checks? Sheesh, I think I've answered this at least three times now. In the absence of a DKIM signature, there is no reason to worry about doubled headers since there is no reason to think one is "real" and the other "fake". They're only a threat when they provide a way to make a DKIM signed message render differently from what the signer expected. No DKIM -> no threat -> no special treatment. I don't know how to make this any clearer. That's why sorting modules don't worry about it now. As I've also said before, either DKIM has a SHOULD about doubled headers, or the equivalent advice goes into the folklore about what you have to do make DKIM useful. Personally, I think the latter would be a cruel joke on future implementors, but apparently other people feel differently. R's, John _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html