[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > doesn't provide much protection. However, Jeffery lobbied for them on > the grounds that they were being used in some existing implementations > (I don't remember which one, but it wasn't Kerberos V5), and that we > should document what some implementations are using today. Shouldn't they be made informative rather than proposed standard in that case? /assar
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option to Pro... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option t... Jeffrey Altman
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Opti... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication ... tytso
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Harald Tveit Alvestrand
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authen... William Allen Simpson
- IP network address assignments/al... Assar Westerlund
- IP network address assignmen... Pete Loshin
- Re: IP network address a... Henning Schulzrinne
- RE: IP network address a... David Newman
- Re: IP network addre... Henning Schulzrinne
- Re: IP network addre... Christian Huitema
- Re: IP network address a... Bill Manning
- Re: IP network addre... Randy Bush
- Re: IP network addre... Brian E Carpenter
- Re: IP network addre... Randy Bush
- Re: IP network addre... Marc Blanchet