> From: "John Stracke" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >There exist security problems associated with HTML-enabled mail readers, > >and the security of this list (given the MASSIVE number of viri > >distributed through it) is sufficiently suspect to disable that in many > >systems. > > We're not talking about this list, though; we're talking about > ietf-announce, where only the Secretariat can post. Moreover, we're > probably talking about an optional digestified form of ietf-announce; > people who can't trust their MUA don't have to use it.
There would be still absolutely no excuse for HTML. Even if the ietf-announce traffic were safe, by sending HTML you are strongly encouraging people to misuse misdesigned browswers as their MUAs and so causing them to be vulnerable to bad traffic from other sources. Besides, as has been pointed out, those of us who actually subscribe to ietf-announce have had not trouble using the URLs that have long been in almost all of those non-HTML messages, whether we are foolish enough to use a browser for our MUAs or not. Yes, I'm wondering how many people complaining about ietf-announce actually subscribe to it, or would subscribe to it in any case. Vernoe Schryver [EMAIL PROTECTED]