---------------------------------------------------------- Visit Indonesia Daily News Online HomePage: http://www.indo-news.com/ and click banner our sponsor ---------------------------------------------------------- INDONESIA IN A CROSSROAD Curiously, as a nation, Indonesia has never really had to choose its leaders through an election. All the first three presidents, Soekarno, Soeharto, and now Habibie, came to power almost by default. Soekarno was probably the closest to being elected by the people, because most of the leaders during the revolution agreed that he was the best man for the job; so, they selected him. Soeharto's elevation was reminiscence of the way Roman Pro-Consul came to the power; after he put down the Communist rebellion, there was no one there left to challenge him. Habibie, of course, became president following Soeharto's resignation. There have been elections in Indonesia before, but not for the presidency. The 1954 election, the last free election, was strictly parliamentary; and all of the elections during Soeharto era, if we can call them that, were more affirmation of his presidency since no one was allowed, or even dared, to run against him. Considering this background, it becomes very clear why this upcoming election is extremely important for Indonesians. For the first time, ever, they will be involved in selecting their leader. Unfortunately, choosing a president in Indonesia is an indirect parliamentary process. The people vote for their parties and then the winning party will choose the president. The main problem with this upcoming election is the fact that this election is very unlikely to produce a majority party. With over 100 political parties participating, it is likely that the three leading parties will have just slightly over 20% each. The secular nationalist PDI-Perjuangan will probably be slightly ahead of the religious PAN and old-Soeharto cronies PKB. Even if the secular nationalist PDI -Perjuangan is to receive the mandate to form government, with such a narrow lead, it will not be able to withstand any challenge in the parliament. Coalition is a possible solution. To reach a majority status of over 51%, however, the secular nationalist PDI-Perjuangan will have to team up with the religious PAN as well as scores of other minor parties. The likelihood that this will happen is very likely. It is also likely that many of the smaller parties will team up and broker the election for their own purposes. This is a possibility because there is a rule which forbid any party which receives less than 10% of the votes to participate in the next election. With this kind of pressure, t! his political gambit may assure their survival. Surprisingly, this situation had happened before, during the 1954 election in Indonesia, when the nationalist PNI, the religious Masyumi, and the communist PKI ended up in front of the pack. The nationalist PNI received the mandate. Several short-lived coalition governments were formed, but none of them was able to withstand challenge in the parliament. Eventually, Soekarno and most of the leaders of the military grew impatience with the democratic process. Soekarno dissolved parliament. If this should happen again before a new president is agreed upon, President Habibie and the Army Chief General Wiranto may well end up as the beneficiary of Indonesia's faulty election system, because technically they do not have to step down until the new president is elected. Should the disagreement in the parliament go on for some length of time, the possibility of a military take over for the sake of order is a likelihood. The type of leader Indonesia needs and the ones she has gotten is clearly never one and the same. Among the current crop of potential leaders being talked about, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais, Hamengku Bowono X, Try Sutrisno, and Gus Dur, none has the charisma of Soekarno nor the wiliness of Soeharto. Even Habibie, many readily admit, is not in the class of the previous two. Indonesia needs for a strong leader is an understatement. Looking at the current economic and social unrest one may wonder why anyone would want to take the leadership position. The new leader of Indonesia not only has to be accepted by most of her population but also understand the differing nature of its population. PREVIOUS LEADERS If we examine the background of some of previous (and current) Indonesian presidents, we see something interesting. Engineering and military were the chosen professions of the first three presidents of Indonesia before they embarked into their political careers: Soekarno was a civil engineer, Soeharto was a military officer, and Habibie is an aeronautical engineer. Curiously, engineers and soldiers are similar in the way they look at the world - they like to function in an orderly world. Engineers and soldiers do not necessarily make for bad leaders, but their persistence in looking for order often makes others uncomfortable. While most politicians expect to spar with the oppositions, political engineers often viewed the oppositions as problems that have to be solved, while political soldiers often viewed oppositions as enemies that have to be destroyed. The ways in which Soekarno and Soeharto ruled clearly showed their unwilingness to let democracy develop. They had deep distrust toward democracy. Both Soekarno and Soeharto have never been exposed to democracy in action, so their actions were predictable. Habibie, on the other hand, has lived in Germany for some fifteen years, where political campaigning and backroom dealing are as common as corruption is in Indonesia. Whether this exposure changed his makeup as a politician, however, is still too early to tell. SOEKARNO - UNITY ABOVE ALL ELSE Soekarno's role during Indonesia's formative years was undeniable. His lack of disregard for democracy started in the mid 1950's. The only truly democratic general election in Indonesia in 1954 didn't produce a dominant political party. Instead, three parties - The Nationalist PNI, The Religious Masyumi, and the Communist PKI - broke away from the pack, though each failed to become the majority party. Several short-lived coalition governments were formed, but none of them lasted long enough to be effective. Eventually, Soekarno and most of the leaders of the military grew impatience with the democratic process. Soekarno dissolved the constituent body, which job it was to create a sorely needed new constitution. He decided to readopt the 1945 Constitution, a war-time constitution which gave the President of Indonesia an unlimited power to act. He restructured the parliament by adding functional groups and the military into it, because he felt that the political parties dominated parliament does not truly represent the cross section of the population. He introduced his concept of Guided Democracy, whereby every political party worked together for a common goal. Soekarno was clearly after a political expediency. He wasn't looking to provide Indonesia with any long-term solution to its political problem. He knew that all the political factions, the nationalist, the religious, the communist, and the army can never be made to work together willingly unless they are united to face a common enemy. After all, he saw all of these factions unite during the revolutionary war for independence of the late 1940's; but, by late-1950's, the lack of a common enemy had once more made them separate entities complete with their own agendas. As an engineer, Soekarno knew that all of those forces have to be balanced perfectly so that it can be directed. His concept of Guided Democracy clearly illustrates his concepts of a perfectly functioning machinery. One thing he forgot to account was that in his machinery, all of the components are constantly scheming to gain control. Soekarno was not a communist, far from it. Yet, as someone who has read and understood Karl Marx, he saw the attractiveness of the communist idea of the constant mass struggle, or the revolution, as it is popularly known. We saw this Marxian theme running throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's. He even formulated the Revolutionary Front and fancied himself the Great Leader of the Revolution. He formed a forced coalition cabinet that is formulaic in nature; one from this party and two from that party, one from this tribe and two from that tribe, etc. Clearly, he was a master when it came to human relation. He was able to form a government without much difficulty; of course, by then the parliament was no longer issuing vote of no confidence which toppled many preceding cabinets. Still, without a common enemy, no matter how well balanced this coalition was, the tension created from the inside was so strong that it was bound to disintegrate. He knew that all he needed was a cause to rally the coalition. The first cause came in the form of secessionist movements of PRRI in Western Sumatra and PERMESTA in Northern Sulawesi during the late 1950's. This became the focus which unite all the opposing forces. Though the republic itself survived this crisis, the regions, especially those outside of Java, realized that their positions in the republic were, at best, second class. The fight to regain West Irian from the Dutch provided Soekarno with the next rallying point. The national sentiment was clearly united behind the cause. The process of armament, unfortunately, took Indonesia closer to the Eastern Communist Bloc more than before. The Eastern Bloc was only too willing to arm Indonesia for the potential conflict, because it provided them with an unexpected growth in their sphere of influence. Thankfully, through diplomacy, an all out conflict was somehow avoided. After a brief United Nations supervised transition, West Irian was returned to Indonesia. Once West Irian was back in the fold, another rallying point was needed. The newly formed Malaysian Federation became the next target of opportunity. The idea of Malaysia, Sabah, Brunei, North Borneo, and Singapore united into one country did not sit well with Soekarno. He saw it as an attempt by the Western powers to contain Indonesia. Everyone knew that the communist influence in Indonesia was by then getting very strong. Not accidentally, this was happening just as the U.S. was facing the communist threat in Viet Nam. While the rest of the world was on the Indonesian side on the West Irian issue, during the "Crush Malaysia" campaign, Indonesia found very few sympathetic ears. Both moves proved to be costly; they put strain on the Indonesian fragile economy. Following Malaysia's election to the non-permanent seat in the United Nations' Security Council, Indonesia decided to leave the U.N. in protest. Burdened with foreign debts, mostly for weapons from the Communist Bloc and for monolithic national monuments that no one appreciate, the Indonesian economy started to collapse. Unable to raise loans and other capitals in the west to finance his follies, Soekarno fired off his infamous "To Hell with Your Aids," speech which further eroded his credibility among his remaining friends in the West. By 1963 and 1964, inflation was easily running at a triple digits rate. In the end, Soekarno's idea of balancing the nationalist, the religious, the communist and, the army - four of the most volatile elements anywhere - backfired. Thinking that the time was ripe for control, the communists assassinated several army generals in an attempted coup that collapsed as soon as it started. In the aftermath, thousands of communists were slaughtered. What was surprising about Soekarno was the fact that he never saw himself as belonging to any of the groups, not even the nationalist. He refused to be identified as a member of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) which he helped found. His role was more like the puppeteer or the "dalang" in a wayang play. He saw the separate factions as no more than characters in his play. SOEHARTO - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FIRST AND FOREMOST Soeharto rise to power was totally unforeseen by anyone. After all he wasn't even important enough to be targeted by the communist for assassination. So, how important could he be? Unlike Soekarno, Soeharto decided to concentrate on the ailing economy. Soeharto's economic plans were clearly successful, after all the country experienced over thirty years of economic growth. The economic growth, however, was achieved artificially, in a non-competitive way. There were no roadblocks to Soeharto's economic development. Every opposition and nay sayers were summarily removed. The high economic growth experienced by Indonesia during his rule was made possible at an equally high cost to personal freedom. Political surveillance became such an art during his rule that people were afraid to say anything controversial. Soeharto used the unlimited power granted him by the 1945 Constitution to forge ahead. Soeharto the political soldier, as expected, ruled by decree. Every piece of legislation during his era was passed without any dissenting voice in the parliament. While most people in the West saw the lack of opposition as fear, Soeharto saw it as total agreement. Though he already had the military behind him, he still saw the need to create yet another support group, GOLKAR, to give the illusion of democracy in an otherwise autocratic system. Several general elections were held to show his Western benefactors that Indonesia is indeed a democratic nation - and his GOLKAR party, of course, was always ended up the winner. The parliament then elected him President in as many times, even when he was the only candidate allowed to run. The legislative bodies gave him their stamps of approval on everything he did. Seriously, what Soeharto did was nothing more than building on top of what Soekarno had done when he decided to include the functional groups into the legislative bodies. Soeharto clearly used the stage that Soekarno created well; however, unlike Soekarno, he was very much a part of the system he created. He fancied himself as a Prabu, a king, in the wayang tradition that is popular among the Javanese. His downfall, which is often referred to as Lengser Keprabon, is a sad acknowledgement of how he viewed himself, as a ruler rather than an elected president of a great republic. Soeharto used his power to guarantee the development of the nation. There could be no opposition; after all, to oppose him was to oppose development. So, for over thirty years, Indonesia has just one voice. For a nation of over 200 million people, it was a relatively quiet one. No one seemed to care that many of his relatives and friends were getting rich unfairly as long as the economy was growing. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism became the rules in business. Banks were often created solely to finance mega-deals even if there were not enough capitals to guarantee their solvency. Rules were compromised by people in the government as well as by those in the private sector. The accumulated debts of the government and the private sector eventually reached critical mass early in 1998 and the Indonesian economy began to unravel. As many loans came due the government and the private sectors found that there were not enough monies in the banks to repay them. The Indonesian Rupiah lost over 80 percents of its value against the U.S. Dollar within a short time. Foreign investment dried up overnight. By then, even Soeharto's absolute power was not enough to guarantee all the loans that were made by his government let alone the private sectors. People demanded his resignation soon after he was again elected president by the rubber-stamping parliament. In the end, the New Order became the victim of the corrupt system that it helped perpetuate. HABIBIE - DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? Now, another engineer has taken over the reign. Soeharto's protigi and foreign educated, unlike Soekarno, Habibie was a member of the cabinet for a long time, yet many people still don't seem know much about him. Habibie's basic problem is the fact that people do not see him as the worthy successor. Many Javanese who long accustomed to seeing the president of the country being a Javanese, or at least part Javanese, consider him no more than an interloper. In a Javanese wayang tradition Habibie is seen as nothing more than a kesatriya sebrang, a worthy noble character who makes an appearance from time to time in a wayang play only to disappear again in the end. People demanded his resignation as soon as he was designated president. Even though Habibie is seen only as a temporary caretaker President until the general election can be held, some of the events that have taken place have increased his standing in some communities. The release of political prisoners, for example, whether or not he was responsible, was greeted warmly by many in the West. Further, by allowing or, at least, not preventing, opposition political parties to develop, he is seen as being sincere for desiring a general election to take place. He knows that by letting the democratic process to take its course, he cannot be faulted should anything drastic happen. Meanwhile, being a more devout Moslem than his predecessors has helped him as well. His standing among the Moslem socio-political groups (such as ICMI) has increased to the point where he no longer has to depend on the support of GOLKAR, which seemed to be disintegrating anyway. The military considers him harmless. At any rate, Habibie seems to have luck on his side - he is almost like an understudy in a play who ended up in the starring role. Habibie has a tremendous task before him. It is made more difficult by the fact that the political machinery is broken. Yet, if he fixes this system, he knows that it will probably prosecute him for his past conducts. Currently, demands to investigate the ill-gotten wealth of Soeharto and his family have become a farce as Habibie and his attorney general tried repeatedly to avoid digging for the truth which may implicate him and most members of his cabinet. He is faced with a very difficult choice. Even with all the power granted him by the 1945 Constitution, his option for using, or abusing, it may simply have run out. All that anyone can do now is hoped for the best for the upcoming general election. Jono Hardjowirogo New York, January 22, 1999 ==================================== Jono Hardjowirogo Publisher, Books and Journals ACM, Inc. 1515 Broadway New York, NY 10036 ==================================== ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Didistribusikan tgl. 23 Jan 1999 jam 03:36:18 GMT+1 oleh: Indonesia Daily News Online <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.Indo-News.com/ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
