I think extensions such as RoHC that change (or extend) the way keying material 
is generated, should and do specify how it is done. Leaving that text there 
becomes a  recommendation for future draft writers, which I think is 
superfluous.

I think we should leave the text as it is.

On Jan 19, 2010, at 4:26 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> One of the differences between RFC 4306 and the IKEv2bis draft is in
> Section 2.17, Generating Key Material for Child SAs. Appendix E.2 of the
> IKEv2bis draft indicates the following:
> 
> In Section 2.17, removed "If multiple IPsec protocols are negotiated,
> keying material is taken in the order in which the protocol headers
> will appear in the encapsulated packet" because multiple IPsec
> protocols cannot be negotiated at one time.
> 
> Is it possible to leave the quoted text in the spec? I agree that multiple
> IPsec protocols cannot be negotiated at one time; however, the text is
> useful for ROHCoIPsec implementers, where multiple keys may need to be
> generated for a ROHC-enabled Child SA.
> 
> For example, if a ROHC-enabled Child-SA with ROHC_INTEG [draft-ietf-rohc-
> ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-09] is instantiated, first the IPsec
> encryption/authentication keying material will be taken, then an
> additional key will be taken for the algorithm used to verify the proper
> decompression of packet headers.
> 
> Also:
> 
> The original text in RFC 4306 was slightly confusing, but I think we
> should leave room for ROHCoIPsec here. Perhaps adding something like
> this after the bulleted list?
> 
>    If the Child SA negotiation includes some future IPsec protocol(s)
>    in addition to (or instead of) ESP or AH (e.g., ROHC_INTEG), then
>    (1) all keys for SAs carrying data from the initiator to the
>    responder are taken before SAs going in the reverse direction, and
>    (2) keying material for the IPsec protocols are taken in the order
>    in which the protocol headers will appear in the encapsulated
>    packet.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium

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