Hi Yoav, > I think extensions such as RoHC that change (or extend) the way keying material is generated, should and do specify how it is done.
I don't think so. If multiple protocols are involves, the way how (in which order) each of them obtains its key from IKE keying material is in general out of scope of individual protocol specifications. Look, for example, at ESP, where one generic rule exists, regardless of algorithms involved: first we take keying bits for encryption (or combined) algorithm and then for authentication algorithm. Proposed text establishes similar generic rule for protocols. I support adding proposed text to help interoperability. Regards, Valery Smyslov. > On Jan 19, 2010, at 4:26 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > > > One of the differences between RFC 4306 and the IKEv2bis draft is in > > Section 2.17, Generating Key Material for Child SAs. Appendix E.2 of the > > IKEv2bis draft indicates the following: > > > > In Section 2.17, removed "If multiple IPsec protocols are negotiated, > > keying material is taken in the order in which the protocol headers > > will appear in the encapsulated packet" because multiple IPsec > > protocols cannot be negotiated at one time. > > > > Is it possible to leave the quoted text in the spec? I agree that multiple > > IPsec protocols cannot be negotiated at one time; however, the text is > > useful for ROHCoIPsec implementers, where multiple keys may need to be > > generated for a ROHC-enabled Child SA. > > > > For example, if a ROHC-enabled Child-SA with ROHC_INTEG [draft-ietf-rohc- > > ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-09] is instantiated, first the IPsec > > encryption/authentication keying material will be taken, then an > > additional key will be taken for the algorithm used to verify the proper > > decompression of packet headers. > > > > Also: > > > > The original text in RFC 4306 was slightly confusing, but I think we > > should leave room for ROHCoIPsec here. Perhaps adding something like > > this after the bulleted list? > > > > If the Child SA negotiation includes some future IPsec protocol(s) > > in addition to (or instead of) ESP or AH (e.g., ROHC_INTEG), then > > (1) all keys for SAs carrying data from the initiator to the > > responder are taken before SAs going in the reverse direction, and > > (2) keying material for the IPsec protocols are taken in the order > > in which the protocol headers will appear in the encapsulated > > packet. > > > > --Paul Hoffman, Director > > --VPN Consortium > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
