Hi Yoav, Thanks for your comments. I would try adding clarity to some of these inline [Manish] to supplement what Mike said.
Manish On 03/10/13 12:14 AM, "Yoav Nir" <y...@checkpoint.com> wrote: >Hi > >I have read the DM-VPN draft. I would not call my reading a review, as it >was quite superficial, but here's some thoughts: > >- I have to admit that I'm still having trouble wrapping my head around >some of the concepts. I understand domain-based and route-pased VPNs, as >well as IPsec and GRE tunnels. But I haven't thought of all the VPN >endpoints as actually being on the same network. In fact I always thought >of VPN as an abstract concept or as a bunch of tunnels, not as a real >network. Having said that, I'm still trying to get used to the idea of >NHRP being used for discovery (and to the idea of NHRP itself). To my >mind a VPN is not an NBMA, but that does not mean an NBMA cannot serve as >a good model for a VPN. [Manish]: What the applications running over the VPN see a VPN as (NBMA or otherwise), depends a lot on the services provided on the VPN and the draft doesn't preclude any possibilities that way. RFC 4301 already prescribes the arms and ammunitions needed to protect IP packets (when used in connection with GRE can be used to protect IP multicast as well as non-IP packets) over untrusted networks. Also, as appropriately noted in the requirements document, 4301 is silent on the way the IPSec databases are populated. So the problem is essentially of discovery and resolution. The discovery can be left to the routing protocol but the resolution would still be needed unless IGPs are multi-protocol, which they typically aren't. Even if they were, this would need a next-hop preservation which won't scale. So, essentially DMVPN picks up an appropriate address resolution protocol in NHRP which is enhanced to support both discovery and resolution. This is combined with GRE to make sure IP multicast and non-IP packets can be seamlessly(without changing any other layer/protocol) carried across the same tunnel and also to simplify the SPDs. > >- I like how the process described in section 4.3 to 4.6 quickly >converges. If host a behind gateway A sends packets to host e behind >gateway E, and the packets travel though the tunnels AB, BC, CD, and DE, >then the discovery process might go through several hops, but the next >tunnel to be set up is AE. There is no case of setting up AC or AD. > >- Reading section 4.8, I see that within a single DM-VPN, there is a >natural progression from hub&spoke to mesh. There doesn't seem to be a >place for policy on whether a shortcut should or should not be >established. The resolution request is forwarded until the egress node. >So if, for example, you have two government agencies, each with its own >set of gateways, and two gateways (one belonging to each agency) have a >tunnel between them, there are two possible configurations: a single >DM-VPN, in which case they become a mesh, or two DM-VPNs, so that the >interdomain tunnel endpoints are egress nodes on their respective >DM-VPNs. Is there a way to implement a policy so that some shortcuts are >created between those other gateways? > >- Section 4.10 seems to be missing something. Suppose gateway A is >forwarding traffic to gateway B, and receives an Indirection >notification. So A sends a Resolution request. After a while, it receives >a Resolution reply with TunS2 and PubS2 addresses. So now A should open a >tunnel with TunS2 (right? I'm not clear about the fields). So section >4.10 says that authentication between these two nodes will be done using >certificates. Considering that A has only just heard of TunS2's >existence, what fields are there going to be in the certificate that will >let A know that this is indeed TunS2? While a single domain might have >some convention for this, AD-VPN is supposed to be good for multiple >administrative domains, so there should be some rule about this. > >- The same section hints at using certificate fields for filtering. This >sounds weird. Suppose two gateways learn of each other through the >resolution process. Now they try to connect, only to find out that the >certificate fields do not allow them to connect. So we've gone through an >entire IKE handshake just to discover that policy prohibits forming this >tunnel? And because caches expire, the gateways will try again and again >to form this tunnel, all the time failing on authorization. [Manish]: Iff routing and NHRP policies(in general, all upper layer policies) allow the shortcut, IKE proceeds till Auth the first time and fails; this can be conveyed back to the upper layer (NHRP) with an appropriate error code, which sends a NACK resolution reply. The NACK serves to stop further resolutions either permanently or for an interval either configured or communicated by the peer. > > >Yoav > >_______________________________________________ >IPsec mailing list >IPsec@ietf.org >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
