Tony and Erik,

As I wrote, I can't see how we could convince the world from going from where we are now to a world that requires people to change their network stack, add a new piece of infrastructure, and to change applications at the same time. That won't happen, any more. Even a "killer application" that requires a stack change and a piece of new infrastructure would be highly unlikely to succeed. Hence, try to minimise the amount of change required at each step.


If we follow that logic, how do we ever deploy any change? Any kind of locator/identifier semantics is necessarily a change, just because it is not the status quo. It will have impact somewhere in the stack and run into the brick wall of actual deployability.

I submit, rather, that we have the ability to deploy change, but that we only have one shot and we'd best do it right. IPv6, while distributed, is not actually deployed in the sense of it being enabled and pervasive yet. If we, as a body, reached consensus on a change, it would be tractable to deploy new stacks. Obviously, it needs to be a worthwhile change.

I would find it very nice if we could change the IP layer, install infrastructure, and change the applications in one shot. I just don't believe that we any more can do it -- we almost failed with IPv6, and IMHO would have failed without the _severe_ address scarcity outside of NA and EU.

People are replacing their computer and operating systems all the time. Hence, a change to the stack *can* be fairly generally implemented in 5-7 years, which is the time of most hosts get replaced or at least undergo a software update.

Given a new stack is there, people *may* start to use a piece of new infrastructure. Getting a new piece of DNS-like infra out there is relatively easy. What is hard is to get people to generally use it and to provide to running the infrastructure by sharing part of the operational load. I wasn't there when DNS was initially deployed, but as far as I have understood, it wasn't exactly painless.

If there is new functionality in the stack and new piece of infrastructure, it *may* be possible to provide sufficient incentives for upgrading the applications. I would imagine that security might be such a feature in the long run.

One thing I didn't understand from the KHI draft is how we can remove the use of these identifiers if they are successful. If folks use them (meaning that they appear in the appropriate places in the DNS, and that stacks know what is an identifier vs. a locator based on the prefix), how would they disappear from use? Is the assumption that the applications would switch to some other API which explicitly passes HIs or HITs?

Yes, that is what I hope to eventually happen.

I don't see much benefits to move the applications to use the existing APIs (e.g., connect()) with a KHI, to some other API which passes a 128-bit HIT without a KHI prefix.
So I must be missing something.

I don't see much incentive for for doing a KHI -> pure HIT transition, but I could imagine some incentive for KHI -> HI transition, where HI can assumedly be much longer and even variable size than a KHI or HIT.

But I do agree with you that we are missing some thinking here, i.e., we are missing a convincing set of incentives. Maybe we should go and try to create them artificially, by reducing the KHI hash size so that they will become insecure sooner that with the current design, and by not allowing the experiment to be continued, say, beyond 2015 even with IETF consensus. _Sort_ of similar to what we did with 6bone, making it very clear from the beginning that people have to eventually move forward.

If the currently secure hash size is about 96 bits, 120 bits can be expected to become insecure in about 24 years.... Maybe that is too much; OTOH, given the recent advances in breaking SHA-1, we should have *some* marginal....

--Pekka


--------------------------------------------------------------------
IETF IPv6 working group mailing list
ipv6@ietf.org
Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Reply via email to