On 24-May-2007, at 17:07, Joe Abley wrote:
I've identified the following areas in which 00 might be modified,
based on traffic in this list and a small handful of private mail.
Please comment on the following, and point out any other
outstanding issues that I missed.
I have made some edits. Note that I am hoping to reach consensus on
the changes to -00 which will produce -01 so that once -01 is
submitted, it is ready for working group last call.
Attached is a proposed -01, and a unified diff from -00 follows.
Please comment on the changes, and suggest others which are needed.
Joe
--- draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-00.unpg 2007-05-28
16:56:44.000000000 -0400
+++ draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-01.unpg 2007-05-28
16:56:59.000000000 -0400
@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@
Network Working Group J. Abley
Internet-Draft Afilias
-Updates: 2460 (if approved) P.
Savola
-Intended status: Standards Track CSC/
FUNET
-Expires: November 29, 2007 G. Neville-
Neil
- Neville-Neil
Consulting
+Updates: 2460, 4294 P.
Savola
+(if approved) CSC/
FUNET
+Intended status: Standards Track G. Neville-
Neil
+Expires: November 29, 2007 Neville-Neil
Consulting
May 28,
2007
Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6
- draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-00
+ draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-01-candidate-00
Status of this Memo
@@ -45,13 +45,12 @@
Abstract
The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
- exploited in order to perform remote network discovery, to bypass
- firewalls and to achieve packet amplification for the purposes of
- generating denial-of-service traffic. This document updates the
IPv6
- specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 Type 0 Routing
Headers, in
- the light of these security concerns.
+ exploited in order to achieve packet amplification for the purposes
+ of generating denial-of-service traffic. This document updates the
+ IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 Type 0 Routing
+ Headers, in the light of the severity of this security concern.
- This document updates RFC 2460.
+ This document updates RFC 2460 and RFC 4294.
Table of Contents
@@ -65,6 +64,12 @@
4.1. Ingress Filtering
4.2. Packet Filtering
5. Security Considerations
+ 5.1. Network Discovery
+ 5.1.1. Testing Ingress Filtering
+ 5.1.2. Finding Attractors
+ 5.2. Bypassing Filtering Devices
+ 5.3. Denial of Service
+ 5.4. Defeating Anycast
6. IANA Considerations
7. Acknowlegements
8. References
@@ -83,11 +88,13 @@
also defined. Type 0 Routing Headers are referred to as "RH0" in
this document.
- Use of RH0 has been shown to have unpleasant security implications,
- some of which are summarised in Section 5. This document deprecates
- the use of RH0.
+ The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
+ exploited in order to achieve packet amplification for the purposes
+ of generating denial-of-service traffic. This document updates the
+ IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 Type 0 Routing
+ Headers, in the light of the severity of this security concern.
- This document updates [RFC2460].
+ This document updates [RFC2460] and [RFC4294].
2. Definitions
@@ -107,6 +114,9 @@
IPv6 nodes MUST NOT originate IPv6 packets containing RH0.
+ IPv6 implementations are no longer required to implement RH0 in any
+ way.
+
3.2. Processing
IPv6 nodes MUST NOT process RH0 in packets addressed to them. Such
@@ -137,17 +147,131 @@
Where filtering capabilities do not facilitate matching specific
types of Routing Headers, filtering based on the presence of any
- Routing Headers on IPv6 routers, regardless of type, is strongly
- discouraged.
+ Routing Headers on IPv6 routers, without explicitly checking the
+ Routing Header type, is strongly discouraged.
5. Security Considerations
The purpose of this document is to deprecate a feature of IPv6
which
- has been shown to have serious security implications.
+ has been shown to have undesirable security implications.
Specific examples of vulnerabilities which are facilitated by the
- availability of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07].
+ availability of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07], and are also
+ summarised below.
+
+5.1. Network Discovery
+
+5.1.1. Testing Ingress Filtering
+
+ A node N1 can probe a second node N2 in a remote autonomous
system in
+ order to discover whether or not that autonomous system implements
+ ingress filtering ([RFC2827], [RFC3704]), so long as N2 supports RH0
+ processing, and N1 is able to identify one of N2's global-scope,
+ unicast IPv6 addresses.
+
+ N1 selects a global-scope source address A1 which is bound to a
local
+ interface, and identifies a global-scope, unicast address A2
which is
+ local to node N2.
+
+ N1 constructs an IPv6 datagram with IPv6 header source A1 and
+ destination address A2, and a RH0 containing the single waypoint
+ address A1. N1 originates the datagram; if the datagram returns to
+ N1, then the autonomous system containing N2 does not implement
+ ingress filtering.
+
+5.1.2. Finding Attractors
+
+ Some services are deployed on the Internet using anycast [RFC4786].
+ Individual anycast nodes normally receive traffic from sources
within
+ a bounded topological region (a "catchment area"). Examples of
+ services deployed using IPv6 anycast include DNS authority
+ nameservers, 6to4 relay routers [RFC3068] and Teredo relays
+ [RFC4380].
+
+ It is usually difficult to determine the number and topological
+ locations of all anycast nodes providing a single service using a
+ single client probe, since only one node is typically visible to a
+ client at any time. By including RH0 in packets addressed to an
+ anycast service address, however, a single client can cause a packet
+ to be sent via hosts or routers located in the catchment area of
+ remote anycast nodes.
+
+ Although the catchment areas of individual anycast nodes vary with
+ changing network topology and routing policy, opportunities to
+ discover the existence of other nodes without using RH0 are, in
+ general, limited. RH0 provides a mechanism for automatic mapping of
+ anycast nodes and their catchment areas, information which might
+ subsequently be used to carry out attacks (see Section 5.4).
+
+5.2. Bypassing Filtering Devices
+
+ Suppose a packet filter F is configured to protect two hosts S1 and
+ S2 which have different requirements for protection: S1 is intended
+ to serve some remote client C, but the filtering policies in F
+ restrict access to S2. An example of such a scenario might be the
+ deployment of a public-facing web server (S1) and some other
internal
+ device which provides an administrative interface over HTTP (S2).
+
+ If client C originates a datagram to S1 and includes a RH0 which
+ specifies an address of S2, then the packet might be passed by F
+ towards S1 and subsequently routed from S1 towards S2 without being
+ subject to the policies enforced by F. If S2 originates a packet in
+ reply towards C, it is feasible that the reply will be permitted by
+ F, and perhaps even that the reply will create state in F
relating to
+ the communication between C and S2 which will allow subsequent
+ packets from C to be sent directly to S2 through F without the
use of
+ RH0.
+
+5.3. Denial of Service
+
+ A single RH0 may contain multiple waypoint addresses, and the same
+ address may be included more than once in the same RH0. This allows
+ a packet to be constructed such that it will oscillate between two
+ RH0-processing hosts or routers many times. This allows a stream of
+ packets from an attacker to be amplified along the path between two
+ remote routers, which could be used to cause congestion along
+ arbitrary remote paths and hence act as a denial-of-service
+ mechanism. 88-fold amplification has been demonstrated using this
+ technique [CanSecWest07].
+
+ This technique can also be used as a more general traffic amplifier,
+ accumulating attack traffic in-flight between two well-connected but
+ mutually-distant waypoints and then finally delivering it towards a
+ third party once the RH0-directed oscillations for each packet are
+ complete. 7-fold amplification has been postulated using this
+ "capacitive effect" [CanSecWest07].
+
+ Various IPv6 transition mechanisms involve the transmission of IPv6
+ packets through tunnels built on IPv4 infrastructure (e.g.
+ [RFC2893], [RFC3056]). Tunnels remain widely-used at the time of
+ writing for the transmission of IPv6 traffic over IPv4 networks.
The
+ use of such tunnels can result in IPv6 paths which include a small
+ number of routers apparently connected by very high latency circuits
+ (tunnels). Such paths provide opportunities to keep packets in-
+ flight for longer, with corresponding increases in amplification
+ potential.
+
+5.4. Defeating Anycast
+
+ Packets originated by a single clients towards anycast destination
+ addresses will normally be routed towards a topologically local
+ anycast node for service. This underpins one of the reasons to
+ deploy services using anycast: to sink traffic from flash crowds
+ locally, allowing damage from non-distributed sources to be
localised
+ to the benefit of clients who are served by different anycast nodes.
+
+ By including RH0 with a waypoint address within the catchment
area of
+ a remote anycast node, a single client can send traffic to multiple
+ anycast nodes providing the same service, avoiding the isolation of
+ such traffic to a single node which would otherwise result.
+
+ Section 5.1.2 describes the use of RH0 to facilitate the
discovery of
+ anycast nodes deployed across the Internet, and to identify sets of
+ clients whose traffic is naturally attracted to particular anycast
+ nodes. Together, these discovery and directed delivery techniques
+ allow all nodes of an anycast service to be targetted by a single
+ host.
6. IANA Considerations
@@ -165,8 +289,10 @@
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-hosts]. These efforts did not gain sufficient
momentum to change the IPv6 specification, but resulted in the
modification of the Mobile IPv6 specification to use the type 2
- Routing Header instead of RH0 [RFC3775]. Routing Header issues were
- later documented in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview].
+ Routing Header instead of RH0 [RFC3775]. Vishwas Manral identified
+ various risks associated with RH0 in 2006 including the
amplification
+ attack; several of these vulnerabilities (together with other
issues)
+ were later documented in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview].
An eloquent and useful description of the operational security
implications of RH0 was presented by Philippe Biondi and Arnaud
@@ -191,11 +317,14 @@
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
+ [RFC4294] Loughney, J., "IPv6 Node Requirements", RFC 4294,
+ April 2006.
+
8.2. Informative References
[CanSecWest07]
BIONDI, P. and A. EBALARD, "IPv6 Routing Header
Security",
- April 2007.
+ CanSecWest Security Conference 2007, April 2007.
http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
@@ -218,12 +347,28 @@
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP
Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
+ [RFC2893] Gilligan, R. and E. Nordmark, "Transition Mechanisms for
+ IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 2893, August 2000.
+
+ [RFC3056] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
+ via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
+
+ [RFC3068] Huitema, C., "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers",
+ RFC 3068, June 2001.
+
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for
Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
+ [RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
+ Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
+ February 2006.
+
+ [RFC4786] Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast
+ Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, December 2006.
+
Appendix A. Change History
@@ -239,6 +384,11 @@
00 Renamed, draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0, a candidate working
group
document.
+ 01-candidate-00 Incorporated text summarising some of the unwelcome
+ uses of RH0; added some clariying text describing deprecation;
+ modified some ambiguous text in Section 4.2; added "Updates:
+ 4294".
+
Authors' Addresses
Network Working Group J. Abley
Internet-Draft Afilias
Updates: 2460, 4294 P. Savola
(if approved) CSC/FUNET
Intended status: Standards Track G. Neville-Neil
Expires: November 29, 2007 Neville-Neil Consulting
May 28, 2007
Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6
draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-01-candidate-00
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
exploited in order to achieve packet amplification for the purposes
of generating denial-of-service traffic. This document updates the
IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 Type 0 Routing
Headers, in the light of the severity of this security concern.
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
This document updates RFC 2460 and RFC 4294.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deprecation of RH0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Packet Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Network Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1.1. Testing Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1.2. Finding Attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Bypassing Filtering Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.4. Defeating Anycast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
1. Introduction
[RFC2460] defines an IPv6 extension header called "Routing Header",
identified by a Next Header value of 43 in the immediately preceding
header. A particular Routing Header subtype denoted as "Type 0" is
also defined. Type 0 Routing Headers are referred to as "RH0" in
this document.
The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
exploited in order to achieve packet amplification for the purposes
of generating denial-of-service traffic. This document updates the
IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 Type 0 Routing
Headers, in the light of the severity of this security concern.
This document updates [RFC2460] and [RFC4294].
2. Definitions
RH0 in this document denotes the IPv6 Extension Header type 43
("Routing Header") variant 0 ("Type 0 Routing Header"), as defined in
[RFC2460].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Deprecation of RH0
3.1. Origination
IPv6 nodes MUST NOT originate IPv6 packets containing RH0.
IPv6 implementations are no longer required to implement RH0 in any
way.
3.2. Processing
IPv6 nodes MUST NOT process RH0 in packets addressed to them. Such
packets MUST be processed according to the behaviour specified in
Section 4.4 of [RFC2460] for a datagram which includes an
unrecognised Routing Type value.
4. Operations
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
4.1. Ingress Filtering
It is to be expected that it will take some time before all IPv6
nodes are updated to remove support for RH0. Some of the uses of RH0
described in [CanSecWest07] can be mitigated using ingress filtering,
as recommended in [RFC2827] and [RFC3704].
4.2. Packet Filtering
Firewall policy intended to protect against packets containing RH0
should be constructed such that routing headers of other types (which
may well have legitimate and benign applications) are handled on
their own merits. For example, discarding all packets with any type
of routing header simply as a reaction to the problems with RH0 is
inappropriate, and may hamper future functionality designed using
non-type 0 routing headers. For example, Mobile IPv6 uses the type 2
Routing Header [RFC3775].
Where filtering capabilities do not facilitate matching specific
types of Routing Headers, filtering based on the presence of any
Routing Headers on IPv6 routers, without explicitly checking the
Routing Header type, is strongly discouraged.
5. Security Considerations
The purpose of this document is to deprecate a feature of IPv6 which
has been shown to have undesirable security implications.
Specific examples of vulnerabilities which are facilitated by the
availability of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07], and are also
summarised below.
5.1. Network Discovery
5.1.1. Testing Ingress Filtering
A node N1 can probe a second node N2 in a remote autonomous system in
order to discover whether or not that autonomous system implements
ingress filtering ([RFC2827], [RFC3704]), so long as N2 supports RH0
processing, and N1 is able to identify one of N2's global-scope,
unicast IPv6 addresses.
N1 selects a global-scope source address A1 which is bound to a local
interface, and identifies a global-scope, unicast address A2 which is
local to node N2.
N1 constructs an IPv6 datagram with IPv6 header source A1 and
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
destination address A2, and a RH0 containing the single waypoint
address A1. N1 originates the datagram; if the datagram returns to
N1, then the autonomous system containing N2 does not implement
ingress filtering.
5.1.2. Finding Attractors
Some services are deployed on the Internet using anycast [RFC4786].
Individual anycast nodes normally receive traffic from sources within
a bounded topological region (a "catchment area"). Examples of
services deployed using IPv6 anycast include DNS authority
nameservers, 6to4 relay routers [RFC3068] and Teredo relays
[RFC4380].
It is usually difficult to determine the number and topological
locations of all anycast nodes providing a single service using a
single client probe, since only one node is typically visible to a
client at any time. By including RH0 in packets addressed to an
anycast service address, however, a single client can cause a packet
to be sent via hosts or routers located in the catchment area of
remote anycast nodes.
Although the catchment areas of individual anycast nodes vary with
changing network topology and routing policy, opportunities to
discover the existence of other nodes without using RH0 are, in
general, limited. RH0 provides a mechanism for automatic mapping of
anycast nodes and their catchment areas, information which might
subsequently be used to carry out attacks (see Section 5.4).
5.2. Bypassing Filtering Devices
Suppose a packet filter F is configured to protect two hosts S1 and
S2 which have different requirements for protection: S1 is intended
to serve some remote client C, but the filtering policies in F
restrict access to S2. An example of such a scenario might be the
deployment of a public-facing web server (S1) and some other internal
device which provides an administrative interface over HTTP (S2).
If client C originates a datagram to S1 and includes a RH0 which
specifies an address of S2, then the packet might be passed by F
towards S1 and subsequently routed from S1 towards S2 without being
subject to the policies enforced by F. If S2 originates a packet in
reply towards C, it is feasible that the reply will be permitted by
F, and perhaps even that the reply will create state in F relating to
the communication between C and S2 which will allow subsequent
packets from C to be sent directly to S2 through F without the use of
RH0.
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
5.3. Denial of Service
A single RH0 may contain multiple waypoint addresses, and the same
address may be included more than once in the same RH0. This allows
a packet to be constructed such that it will oscillate between two
RH0-processing hosts or routers many times. This allows a stream of
packets from an attacker to be amplified along the path between two
remote routers, which could be used to cause congestion along
arbitrary remote paths and hence act as a denial-of-service
mechanism. 88-fold amplification has been demonstrated using this
technique [CanSecWest07].
This technique can also be used as a more general traffic amplifier,
accumulating attack traffic in-flight between two well-connected but
mutually-distant waypoints and then finally delivering it towards a
third party once the RH0-directed oscillations for each packet are
complete. 7-fold amplification has been postulated using this
"capacitive effect" [CanSecWest07].
Various IPv6 transition mechanisms involve the transmission of IPv6
packets through tunnels built on IPv4 infrastructure (e.g.
[RFC2893], [RFC3056]). Tunnels remain widely-used at the time of
writing for the transmission of IPv6 traffic over IPv4 networks. The
use of such tunnels can result in IPv6 paths which include a small
number of routers apparently connected by very high latency circuits
(tunnels). Such paths provide opportunities to keep packets in-
flight for longer, with corresponding increases in amplification
potential.
5.4. Defeating Anycast
Packets originated by a single clients towards anycast destination
addresses will normally be routed towards a topologically local
anycast node for service. This underpins one of the reasons to
deploy services using anycast: to sink traffic from flash crowds
locally, allowing damage from non-distributed sources to be localised
to the benefit of clients who are served by different anycast nodes.
By including RH0 with a waypoint address within the catchment area of
a remote anycast node, a single client can send traffic to multiple
anycast nodes providing the same service, avoiding the isolation of
such traffic to a single node which would otherwise result.
Section 5.1.2 describes the use of RH0 to facilitate the discovery of
anycast nodes deployed across the Internet, and to identify sets of
clients whose traffic is naturally attracted to particular anycast
nodes. Together, these discovery and directed delivery techniques
allow all nodes of an anycast service to be targetted by a single
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
host.
6. IANA Considerations
The IANA registry "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters"
should be updated to reflect that variant 0 of IPv6 header-type 43
("Routing Header") is deprecated.
7. Acknowlegements
Potential problems with Routing Headers were identified in 2001
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security]. In 2002 a proposal was made to
restrict Routing Header processing in hosts
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-hosts]. These efforts did not gain sufficient
momentum to change the IPv6 specification, but resulted in the
modification of the Mobile IPv6 specification to use the type 2
Routing Header instead of RH0 [RFC3775]. Vishwas Manral identified
various risks associated with RH0 in 2006 including the amplification
attack; several of these vulnerabilities (together with other issues)
were later documented in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview].
An eloquent and useful description of the operational security
implications of RH0 was presented by Philippe Biondi and Arnaud
Ebalard at the CanSecWest conference in Vancouver, 2007
[CanSecWest07]. This presentation resulted in widespread publicity
for the risks associated with RH0.
This document also benefits from the contributions of IPv6 and V6OPS
orking group participants, including Jari Arkko, Arbaud Ebalard, Tim
Enos, Brian Haberman, Jun-ichiro itojun HAGINO, Bob Hinden, JINMEI
Tatuya, David Malone, Jeroen Massar, Dave Thaler and Guillaume
Valadon.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC4294] Loughney, J., "IPv6 Node Requirements", RFC 4294,
April 2006.
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
8.2. Informative References
[CanSecWest07]
BIONDI, P. and A. EBALARD, "IPv6 Routing Header Security",
CanSecWest Security Conference 2007, April 2007.
http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview]
Davies, E., "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security
Considerations", draft-ietf-v6ops-security-overview-06
(work in progress), October 2006.
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security]
Savola, P., "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home
Address Options", draft-savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security-02
(work in progress), March 2002.
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-hosts]
Savola, P., "Note about Routing Header Processing on IPv6
Hosts", draft-savola-ipv6-rh-hosts-00 (work in progress),
February 2002.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC2893] Gilligan, R. and E. Nordmark, "Transition Mechanisms for
IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 2893, August 2000.
[RFC3056] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[RFC3068] Huitema, C., "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers",
RFC 3068, June 2001.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
February 2006.
[RFC4786] Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast
Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, December 2006.
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
Appendix A. Change History
This section to be removed prior to publication.
00 Strawman, draft-jabley-ipv6-rh0-is-evil, circulated to provoke
discussion.
01 Clarified Section 3; presented more options in Section 4; added
Pekka and George as authors. This document version was not widely
circulated.
00 Renamed, draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0, a candidate working group
document.
01-candidate-00 Incorporated text summarising some of the unwelcome
uses of RH0; added some clariying text describing deprecation;
modified some ambiguous text in Section 4.2; added "Updates:
4294".
Authors' Addresses
Joe Abley
Afilias Canada Corp.
Suite 204, 4141 Yonge Street
Toronto, ON M2P 2A8
Canada
Phone: +1 416 673 4176
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Pekka Savola
CSC/FUNET
Espoo,
Finland
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
George Neville-Neil
Neville-Neil Consulting
2261 Market St. #239
San Francisco, CA 94114
USA
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Deprecation of RH0 May 2007
Full Copyright Statement
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Abley, et al. Expires November 29, 2007 [Page 10]
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