> Brian E Carpenter <mailto:brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com>
> 3 May 2013 22:16
>
> Exactly. I think that draft-ietf-6man-ug clarifies this to some extent,
> as a side-effect of clarifying the U/G bits. Would it be useful to add
> an extra sentence in that draft, simply stating that a number of
> independent methods for forming an IID can exist?
>
> Brian
Yes.

I think there's potentially a number of things to consider clarifying  :

1) There may be multiple independent methods for forming an IID.

2) These methods SHOULD NOT assume any exclusivity, either on a per
link, per interface, or per prefix basis.

3) DAD is the recognised mechanism for testing whether a unicast address
is unique.

4) I have a question regarding existing RFC4862 implementations, and a
very unlikely chain of events.

Quote: draft-ietf-6man-ug  states "Specifications of other forms of
64-bit IID MUST specify how all 64 bits are set, but need not treat the
"u" and "g" bits in any special way." OK current text of
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses is compliant with that.

What happens in the unlikely event that these new mechanisms for
creating an IID (such as draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses) and
which ignore setting u/g bits, cause a DAD clash with existing
link-local addresses created compliant to RFC 4862 (IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration) especially regarding Section 5.4.5 (When
Duplicate Address Detection Fails), which DOES rely on the u bit?

4862 states: "On the other hand, if the duplicate link-local address is
not formed from an interface identifier based on the hardware address,
which is supposed to be uniquely assigned, IP operation on the interface
MAY be continued."

How would the node using 4862+4291 know the difference whether the
duplicate was caused by another node running 4862+4291 with a duplicate
MAC/EUI-64 hardware address, or because of
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses or some other mechanism?

Presumably by checking the incoming DAD probe NS packet to check if the
transform of the EUI-64 / link-layer hardware source address matches the
interface identifier stripped from the Target Address?

Do all existing 4862 implementations perform this check before disabling
IPv6 processing on the interface?

I think that this additional check is a candidate for a SHOULD, rather
than a MAY, and also needs highlighting in draft-ietf-6man-ug .

regards,
RayH
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