On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 08:04:24AM -0700, Matt Johnson wrote: > Eugen, I don't think MTA configuration will help the target audience > of the cryptoparties. I doubt many of them run their own mail servers.
Relying on your ISP-issued relay or your mail provider's SMTP provides a convenient one-stop shop for information collection. It is definitely possible and desirable for small organisations and groups of users to run their own SMTP servers, and potentially also IMAP servers. All it takes is a static IP address which is not on the usual blacklists. We must get users out of the cloud. > I believe they are targeting end user client machines. > > Of course you are right that many users will stop using it if it is > difficult. The idea of the cryptoparty, as I understand it, it to help > those users. This way more people learn how to use cryptography and > the the people who write the cryptography software may learn what is > difficult for end users. > > Your dismissive attitude will not help, the cryptoparty might. My or your attitude will not change the fact that use of GNUPG in MUA will not happen on a large scale. Nor will any amount of cryptoparties. Even the developers of GNUPG are of the opinion, which why they've been pushing towards STEED http://g10code.com/steed.html which obviously has one giant cloven hoof speaking against it: DNS. Now, they have *two* problems, not one. StartTLS already secures order of magnitude more traffic than PGP in MUAs or PGP gateways ever will (look into this message's rich headers, chances are, you're already secure along some part of transport way without being even aware of it). And of course it's fully compaptible with VPNs, or GNUPG or whatever have you. > -- > Matt Johnson > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 12:56 AM, Eugen Leitl <eu...@leitl.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 12:11:34AM -0700, William Gillis wrote: > >> Now that everyone knows about the NSA isn't it time you tackled setting up > >> PGP? > > > > If it's not transparent, Johny User will eventually drop it. > > > > Before you do that, rather enable StartTLS on your mail > > transport agent (e.g. postfix). And then install email encryption > > gateways http://www.postfix.org/addon.html#security-gateway > > https://code.google.com/p/gpg-mailgate/ > > > > After you have done that, you can turn to PGP/SMIME for end > > user MUAs. > > > >> Are you or friends you know looking to adopt bread and butter encryption > >> tools online and on your phone? Could you use folks to show the way, lend a > >> hand, answer questions, or offer explanations? Drop by Sudoroom (2141 > >> Broadway, Oakland CA) between 1pm and 4:30pm this Sunday the 16th! > >> > >> The NSA leaks provide most folks with a rare impetus to slog though > >> installing and getting up to speed on the basics. If you can merely handle > >> showing random people off the street one-on-one how to download textsecure > >> from google's appstore, you're golden, we want you to come hang with us and > >> potentially save people's lives, certainly their privacy. > >> > >> Think impromptu demonstrations, one-on-one help and informal presentations. > >> > >> https://sudoroom.org/ai1ec_event/digital-security-workshop/?instance_id > > -- > > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org";>leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
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