On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 8:00 PM, Jillian C. York <jilliancy...@gmail.com>wrote:
> Since I already have more skepticism of Google Ideas and Jared Cohen than > I need, let me pose this question: > > With the understanding that uProxy provides no anonymity protections, *is > it providing anything that other circumvention tools do not already?* > What's unique about it? > "No anonymity protections" is a bit of a stretch if "anonymity" includes browsing from a country that tries, but fails to snoop on your traffic. But sure, it doesn't pretend to be a cookie blocker, or Tor. uProxy, as far as I can tell, provides an easy way to use fast connections you trust. Very strong emphasis on "easy" and "fast" (i.e. noncongested.) So, you can browse securely from a coffee shop or Iran without the hassles that come with most other similar tools (difficult setup for self-hosted VPN servers, trusting a third-party provider for hosted VPN services, lacking usability/non-intuitive setup and interface for many pieces of privacy software, and very variable speed for services like Tor.) > > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Dan Staples < > danstap...@opentechinstitute.org> wrote: > >> And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to >> provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many >> challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve. >> Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now >> being packaged as an entire browser bundle. >> >> What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of >> uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its >> partners. >> >> Dan >> >> On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote: >> > On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote: >> >> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no >> >> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own >> >> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably >> >> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching >> >> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they >> >> offer here. >> >> >> > google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head >> > canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are >> > not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the >> > small heads to go on and do their work. >> > >> >> >> >> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's >> >> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the >> >> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a >> >> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to >> >> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's >> >> repressive internet policies. >> > >> > Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I >> > assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy >> > software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone >> > from BNS could elaborate >> > >> > In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in >> > this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly >> > observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within >> > country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating >> > those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to >> > eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before.. >> > >> > >> > Cheers, Sacha >> > >> > >> > >> >> -- >> Dan Staples >> >> Open Technology Institute >> https://commotionwireless.net >> OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc >> Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 >> -- >> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations >> of list guidelines will get you moderated: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at >> compa...@stanford.edu. >> > > > > -- > *Note: *I am slowly extricating myself from Gmail. Please change your > address books to: jilliancy...@riseup.net or jill...@eff.org. > > US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 > site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | * > twitter: @jilliancyork* * > > "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the > seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel* > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. >
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