I'm really interested in your in-country torrent deployments, Griffin. I agree the threats are complicated. Is an infiltrating seeder in Iran learning about someone serving the Tor binary dangerous for that person serving it, for example? I would tend to say it's no more or less dangerous than putting a satellite dish on your roof, but I'm not sure. If the infiltrator was learning about someone serving the Neda video in 2009 it would likely be a different story, however. As far as I can tell, the severity of the threat depends on two things:
1) The nature of the content 2) The attractiveness of the uploader as a person of interest Some form of active replication could be useful to disguise an original publisher, but it's tough to make that airtight and maybe it makes more sense to just avoid using BitTorrent for content publishing entirely in this context? As in, only use it as a means for pushing content in and not out. I find this approach interesting for two reasons: 1) The bandwidth in a lot of these countries is so limited that keeping traffic local is handy, as is having multiple copies to download from both for speed and for making sure the content doesn't get destroyed 2) You don't have to worry about filtering in the same way once you're in the country Forgive me for thinking out loud a bit. -Adam On Thu, Mar 6, 2014 at 11:29 PM, Griffin Boyce <grif...@cryptolab.net> wrote: > > Nathan of Guardian wrote: >> Github? Maybe not whole sites, but specific files. > > I've been working with users who have networks in censored countries > to expand access to specific software bundles. My two approaches right > now are Google Web Store and torrents attached to a stable offsite > seedbox. Both are fairly accessible, but both have pros/cons. With > torrents, someone can sit as a seeder and try to tally information on > downloaders. Google Web Store downloads are tracked in unknown (legally > requestable?) ways by Google and of course it requires > downloading/installing Google Chrome to gain access. > > It's not perfect, but at least for the user groups I talk to, they are > realistic solutions to a really tricky problem. > > ~Griffin > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. -- -- Adam pgp A998 2B6E EF1C 373E 723F A813 045D A255 901A FD89 -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
