On 01/10/2018 02:04 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 06:26:47PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> Set IBRS upon kernel entrance via syscall and interrupts. Clear it
>> upon exit.  IBRS protects against unsafe indirect branching predictions
>> in the kernel.
>>
>> The NMI interrupt save/restore of IBRS state was based on Andrea
>> Arcangeli's implementation.
>> Here's an explanation by Dave Hansen on why we save IBRS state for NMI.
>>
>> The normal interrupt code uses the 'error_entry' path which uses the
>> Code Segment (CS) of the instruction that was interrupted to tell
>> whether it interrupted the kernel or userspace and thus has to switch
>> IBRS, or leave it alone.
>>
>> The NMI code is different.  It uses 'paranoid_entry' because it can
>> interrupt the kernel while it is running with a userspace IBRS (and %GS
>> and CR3) value, but has a kernel CS.  If we used the same approach as
>> the normal interrupt code, we might do the following;
>>
>>      SYSENTER_entry
>> <-------------- NMI HERE
>>      IBRS=1
>>              do_something()
>>      IBRS=0
>>      SYSRET
>>
>> The NMI code might notice that we are running in the kernel and decide
>> that it is OK to skip the IBRS=1.  This would leave it running
>> unprotected with IBRS=0, which is bad.
>>
>> However, if we unconditionally set IBRS=1, in the NMI, we might get the
>> following case:
>>
>>      SYSENTER_entry
>>      IBRS=1
>>              do_something()
>>      IBRS=0
>> <-------------- NMI HERE (set IBRS=1)
>>      SYSRET
>>
>> and we would return to userspace with IBRS=1.  Userspace would run
>> slowly until we entered and exited the kernel again.
>>
>> Instead of those two approaches, we chose a third one where we simply
>> save the IBRS value in a scratch register (%r13) and then restore that
>> value, verbatim.
>>
> 
> What this Changelog fails to address is _WHY_ we need this. What does
> this provide that retpoline does not.
> 

Ok. I mentioned that in the cover letter that IBRS is a maximum security
mode in the CPU itself to directly restrict all indirect branches to prevent 
SPECTRE v2.

I'll also include such comments in the commit log here.

Thanks.

Tim

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