On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 1:06 AM Masami Hiramatsu <mhira...@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Mar 2019 18:37:59 -0800 > Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > > We've had this before. We've gotten rid of the actual "use system > > calls", but we still have some of the init sequence in particular just > > calling the wrappers instead. > > Are those safe if we are in init sequence?
Yes, they are, it runs with set_fs(KERNEL_DS). But the patches made that now complain about copying from non-user space, even though it's fine. Basically, "strncpy_from_user()" shouldn't use "user_access_ok()", since it actually can take a kernel address (with set_fs()). Your "unsafe" version for tracing that actually sets "set_fs(USER_DS)" is thje only thing that should use that helper. > > And yes, ksys_mount() takes __user pointers. > > > > It would be a lot better to use "do_mount()", which is the interface > > that takes actual "char *" pointers. > > Unfortunately, it still takes a __user pointer. Ahh, yes, the name remains in user space. Besides, I'm sure you'd just hit other cases instead where people use set_fs() and copy strings. > So what we need is > > long do_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *dir_path, > const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page) > > or introduce kern_do_mount()? It's actually fairly painful. Particularly because of that "void *data_page". Your second email with "Would this work?" helper function _wopuldn't_ work correctly, exactly because you passed in a regular string to the data page. Also, I don't want to see code that replaces the unconditional "copy path from user space" with a conditional "do we have path in kernel space". So together with the whole "uyou'll hit other peoblems anyway", I don't think this is a good approach. I think you simply need to have a separate "unsafe_strncpy()" function, and not change the existing "strncpy_from_user()". Linus