The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS, even if that user has administrative privileges. This is an initial attempt at a set of patches to reduce root's ability to modify the kernel. We've done this with an additional capability for a couple of reasons:
1) CAP_SYS_RAWIO already covers pretty much everything we want, but also disables a lot of functionality that we don't want to lose. Following the same model seems reasonable. 2) This capability may be more generically useful for some use-cases. Adding a set of hardcoded is_secure_boot() checks in the same places would prevent that. Feedback welcome. -- Matthew Garrett | mj...@srcf.ucam.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
