On 15-05-22 08:28:17, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2015-05-22 at 08:48 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> > Luis R. Rodriguez <mcg...@suse.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > This is similar to what i am doing right now - create CA hierarchy so
> > > > we can
> > > > have something like:
> > > >
> > > > +-> KeyB
> > > > |
> > > > RootCA ---> CertA ---> CertB ---> CertC ---> KeyC
> > > > |
> > > > +-> CertA' ---> KeyA"
> > >
> > > How exactly do you go about uploading CertB to the kernel BTW?
> >
> > Assuming RootCA or CertA is present in the kernel, the idea would be to use
> > the add_key() system call or the request_key() mechanism to add the key to
> > the system keyring. The key in the cert would only be added to the keyring
> > if it is trusted by a key already there.
>
> From Petko's description, the RootCA is on the system keyring, but CertA is
> on
> a new IMA trusted CA keyring. So everything you said is true, but on this
> new, yet to be upstreamed, IMA trusted CA keyring.
I only named this intermediate keyring .ima_root_ca because this is how i use
it. However, it is system-wide trusted keyring, which accepts keys that are
either trusted by CAs in the .system_keyring or higher level CA is already in
.ima_root_ca. For example CertC will be accepted in .ima_root_ca if CertB is
already there.
The name (.ima_root_ca) is misleading and should be replaced with something
that
better describes it's functionality. As far as i see there is no reason this
keyring not to hold the CA that verifies module's signature.
Petko
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