However, there is a pseudo registry in Wine implementations. I checked the wine registry files in my Redhat 8.0 and the registry key that the worm looks for (according to CERT) is not present. That is not to say that the virus couldn't be modified to attack a wine-based Linux system, but then there is the additional hurdle of permission to modify root-controlled files.
The wine registry files aren't root controlled, they're in the user's .wine directory. And the virus adds its own entries in the registry using the Win32 API calls. But the autorun entry might be of no effect as Wine probably does not notice it. But it's important to realize the goal of Wine is to give a Windows app - whether malicious or beneficial - a near perfect simulated Windows environment to run in. So as Wine gets better, so does its ability to expose us to such malware.
Since, IIRC, Outlook, Outlook Express, and Internet Explorer are reported to run near perfectly in Wine (or Crossover Office), it would be prudent to assume a virus would have access to all the right facilities to run as normal. But I'm speculating alot.
It does, however, severely call into question our never ending efforts to be able to run Windows apps on Linux (VMWare, Win4Lin, Wine). Even if you only let half the camel into the tent, it still makes life in the tent alot worse.
Michael
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