ok, done :)
mvseeno mislim da je ze samo sporocilo v anglescini neumestno in
neinformativno..., samo nimam casa da bi napisal mail avotrjevm in ne
poguma (oziroma nocem nrediti kake skode, ker se na izvor ne spoznam) da
bi stvar spremenil na lastno roko ;)

tnx
Lep Pozdrav
Andraz Tori
On Sat, 25 Nov 2000, Ales Kosir wrote:

> Andra` Tori wrote:
> > ne wem a je /dev/random res random ali semirandom?
> 
> Pred nekaj casa smo se pogovarjali o prevodu sporocila:
> "Nisem na9el dovolj entropije na va9em sistemu". 
> 
> Razprava pa je, kot se rado zgodi pri pogovorih o entropiji, zasla. Zdaj
> prilagam sestavek, iz katerega je moc razbrati, zakaj si sistem zeli
> entropicne (nakljucne) dogodke in kako jih uporabi pri /dev/random in
> nadomestno pri /dev/urandom (kjer jih sploh ne!). Sestavek na nakljucne
> dogodke gleda s stalisca uporabe pri kriptografiji, tako kot se v balsi,
> ki jo je Andraz prevajal, to tudi rabi.
> 
>   ``Random'' numbers generated by many library routines are intended to
>    be used for simulations, games, and so on; they are not sufficiently
>    random for use in security functions such as key generation. The
>    problem is that these library routines use algorithms whose future
>    values can be easily deduced by an attacker (though they may appear
>    random). For security functions, you need random values based on
> truly
>    unpredictable values such as quantum effects.
>  
>    Failing to correctly generate truly random values for keys has caused
>    a number of problems, including holes in Kerberos, the X window
>    system, and NFS [Venema 1996].
>  
>    The Linux kernel (since 1.3.30) includes a random number generator,
>    which is sufficient for many security purposes. This random number
>    generator gathers environmental noise from device drivers and other
>    sources into an entropy pool. When accessed as /dev/random, random
>    bytes are only returned within the estimated number of bits of noise
>    in the entropy pool (when the entropy pool is empty, the call blocks
>    until additional environmental noise is gathered). When accessed as
>    /dev/urandom, as many bytes as are requested are returned even when
>    the entropy pool is exhausted. If you are using the random values for
>    cryptographic purposes (e.g., to generate a key), use /dev/random.
>    More information is available in the system documentation
> random(4).   
> 
> Iz: Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO, David A. Wheeler  
> 
> Da bi bila sporocila uporabniku balse bolj razumljiva, predlagam, da v
> slovenskem prevodu 
> ``entropijo'' v originalu zamenjamo z ``nakljucnimi dogodki''.
> 
> Nisem na9el dovolj entropije na va9em sistemu -> 
> V sistemu ni dovolj nakljucnih dogodkov.
> 
> In tako naprej:
> 
> msgid "Filling entropy pool"
> msgstr "Z nakljucnimi dogodki polnim zalogo entropije"  
> 
> #: libmutt/imap/imap_ssl.c:138
> msgid "SSL disabled due the lack of entropy"
> msgstr "SSL izkljucen zaradi pomanjkanja nakljucnih dogodkov" 
> 
> -- 
> Lep pozdrav,
> Aleš
> 
> 


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