I've inteleaved my comments in the foliage of your commentary.----- Original Message ----- From: "Ralph Dumain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 3:51 Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Interleaved comments on further fragments of your post: At 03:08 AM 5/28/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote:.......... I see your not going to let me deal with the dogmatics of classical materialism briefly. The kernel of my argument is that in general, discourse segregated from practice can only be theological, i.e. concerning articles of faith rather than descriptions of demonstrable practice. I say in general, sincescientists usually discuss their findings with only minimal reference to the practicalities that are the origins and ultimate objects of their work. Thisis mostly a manifestation of the extreme division of labour that isolatesprofessional researchers from all but the immediate subjects of their work.In any case, I've yet to see a monograph or article of a natural scientist that presents his work as having universal significance. There areexceptions to this rule such as Hawkins in physics and Dawkins in population genetics, and the result is invariably utter nonsense. I'm referring here to Hawkins conviction that unified field theory will provide an ultimate theoryof the physical world and to Dawkin's projection of the mechanics of population genetics to the science of culture (memics and all that). Science as the theory of practice is implicitly restricted in relevance tothe conditions of the moment (even when the problems it is designed to treat are projected into the near or far future). The discoveries of this kind ofscience are inevitably relevant only to the particular circumstances of their production, and to the specific subjects of their focus and have no claim as eternal truths. Einstein, Newton and Galileo will never acquire the sainthood of the revealers of final truths. On the contrary, their ideas will only remain significant so long as they are relevant to the practices and technologies that we men need to perpetuate ourselves, "ourselves" here meaning the entire complex of organic and inorganiccomponents of our individual and collective life activities. Thus, scienceas the theory of practice is an inherently revolutionary activity.This is interesting as a vantage point, i.e. beginning from the scope of praxis and explaining why scientists can be blockheads when they venture beyond the specific praxis that enabled them to achieve what they did. But I find this approach more credible when it is re-routed back to objectivity.
Come again?
Discussion on the nature of being, on the substance of nature, and so on isfrom the point of view of historical materialism no less restricted to the conditions of its production than is practical science. However, theinherent object of such discussions is the determination of the absolute andfinal nature of things at all places and in all times. The ostensibleobject of the advocates of such metaphysical finalities is the expression ofultimate truths regarding the universe and its parts, the absolute contradiction to the objects of practice and the science of practice. Anyway, it is one thing to develop theories concerning particularities of that grand everything we call nature, it's quite another to present particular results as universals about the universe. The former can be demonstrated, proved if you will, the latter extends beyond allpossibilities of human experience, hence it can only be a product either ofdivine revelation or of normative practice, i.e. ethos. I prefer ethos to divine revelation.I'm afraid I don't quite grasp this. You are suggesting, I think, that general ontological pronouncements not tied to some current concerns of praxis become fruitless or even retrograde metaphysics. I don't quite agree with this, but I do agree that these traditional philosophical concerns become more dynamic and fruitful when connected to specific problems of the present.
The utility of general ontological pronouncements is not in question. Undoubtedly they are useful otherwise they would never be made. I'm arguing that ontological pronouncements are retrograde metaphysics and bad science.
..........> I think you're right. The question then is--how to put this?--the line > of> demarcation between nature in itself and . . . nature for us . . . and> science. I've been cautious about making claims about the 'dialectics > of > nature' in se, i.e. apart from our methods of analysis (which I guess > you> might call 'contemplative'. This is the old problem, as traditional > terminology puts it, of the relation between (or very existence of) > subjective (dialectical logic as subject of debate) and objective > dialectics (which, with respect to nature, is the focus of positive and > negative engagements with dialectical thought). It's not clear to me > whether you would go along with my various analyses of this problematic > over the past dozen years, or even accept such a conceptual > distinction. But I think that the mess we've inherited shows up its > historical importance. While I agree we need an overarching conception > that somehow interrelates "nature, society, and thought", the direct> identification of all of these components with the same dialectical > laws > is, I think, a logically blurred mistake. I believe this implicit > problem> comes up time and time again in the history of debates, whether among> British intellectuals in the '30s, the pseudonymous debate between > Novack > and Van Heijenoort circa 1943, the debate between Norman and Sayers, > etc.>I'm in full agreement with you on the existence of such a problem in Marxistthinking. It is my feeling that the debate on the problem, particularly among Western Marxists has been considerably confuscated by a failure to distinguish between the diverse objects of subjective thought and thedivergent ways these objects are tested in practice. It took a Habermas to realize what Vygotsky had already made clear in his research and theoretical works in the late 1920's, that there is a distinctive difference between the dialectics of sociability of culturally historically situated ethical theory and the dialectics of instrumental practical thought, i.e. science. DespiteHegel's firm belief in an absolute ideal there is not nor can there be any true universality of reasoning among men regarding ethics. Even soHabermas, unlike Vygotsky, misses the whole point of this distinction by hisfailure to come to grips with the dialectical relation between scientific and ethical thought. While historical and cultural conditions do restrict the object of scientific activity, the fact that scientific thought is engendered and realized in material practice implies that it focusses on certain key universals of human activity, namely men's interaction with nature as a force of nature, that serve as a ground for evaluatingscientific activity that is common to all men. The difference is importantbecause while ethical consciousness is limited by local social practice (norms and such) and is justified as the incontroversial expressions of common sense, scientific subjectivity is solely the function of practical instrumental experience and is justified first and foremost by its physically and sensually detected impact on the world. For example, the indigenous agriculturalists of Papua traded for iron axes long before they adopted European dress and concepts of physical modesty, colonial administration and European systems of governance, and Christianity. I think that the Soviet dialecticians, and particularly Ilyenkov, came closest to a sufficient formulation of the distinction between scientific and the more profoundly restricted forms of subjective consciousness andpresented a paradigmatic model for the effective scientific analysis of thelatter . Unfortunately, the mainstay of Western interpretations of Ilyenkov's works is the absolutely wierd product of a Brit academic whorepresents them as a sort of sociologically oriented form of Neo-positivism(itself a contradiction!). I wrote a first draft on his work that was totally unsatisfactory (too lacking in focus), and am now finishing up the outline of a revision which hopefully will be the basis of a more accurate presentation than was my first effort.I don't quite get this. But my first question is: who is this Brit neo-positivist academic?
Dave Bakhurst of Queens College Ontario and author of Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov. 1991
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