Your reasoning is fine up until the braking point I note below.
At 03:10 PM 5/29/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote:
Steve,
Well, now I know what comes after the <snip>.
First paragraph:
Oudeyis is saying nothing about what nature is, but rather is writing that
whatever understandings man has of nature are a function primarily of his
active interaction (his labour) with the natural conditions of his
existence. The difference between knowing what nature is (i.e. its
essential being or "nature" if you will) and having a working knowledge of
world conditions is all the difference between the treatment of nature in
Marxist and classical materialist theory. Now then, the only part of nature
humanity can know is that part of it with which he has some sort of
contact, and at least for Marxism, the only part of nature about which man
can develop theories of practice is that which he can or has changed in some
fashion. When it comes to explaining the practical foundation scientific
cosmology we argue that the theories regarding the behaviour of huge masses
of material over barely conceivable periods of time and spatial dimensions
are projections based more often as not on experimentation with some of the
very smallest of the universe's components; atoms, quarks, and so on).
Anyway, its hard to imagine how men would know things about which they have
absolutely no experience and how they would know how things work without a
working experience with them or with things like them. Divine revelation
perhaps? Finally, there is no doubt that nature must also include that
which is beyond the observed and acted upon and that its existence is
important for the creation of a materialist ideology. There are three ways
the "unknown" makes itself felt in material human experience:
1.The fact that human practice and the science that represents it in thought
is open ended or, better yet, appears to have no outward limits is a clear
indication of the existence of more to nature than that which is treated by
our current state of knowledge and practice.
2. The classic observations by Marx in the first chapter of German Ideology
(1845) and the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy (1844) that the physical and
sensual interface between man a nature in human labour is far more concrete
than can ever be represented by even the most developed dialectics. The
rational representation of men's activity in the world is then an inherently
uncompletable task.
3. Hegel in his discussion of being makes the point that the logical
formula A = A has no demonstrable correspondence with actual experience;
diversity is an inherent property of identity (Andy B. presents a pretty
thorough discussion on this in his The Meaning of Hegel, Chapter iv section,
" Diversity(essential Identity )" ). The whole basis of all rational
activity, all dialectics, conscious and unconscious, deliberated and
automatic, is the unity between the essential transitoriness of experienced
moments and the determination of identities; qualities, quantities, measure
and all the other things we have to "know" to develop a working model of the
world. It's the unity of logical categorization and the essential
temporality of immediate experience that fuels the dialectic and makes it so
important a tool for exploration of the unknown.
Second paragraph:
The clarification of what exactly is the significance of the *objective*
nature of nature is probably Ilyenkov's most important contributions to
Scientific Marxism. Indeed for orthodox Marxists, including Lenin in his
earlier writings (prior at very least to his readings in Hegel in 1914 and
possibly as early as his article on Emprio-positivism), did indeed inherit
the classical materialist concept of the objectivity of nature in the
metaphysical sense of the essential being of nature; known, unknown,
whatever. Ilyenkov in the last paragraphs of chapter 8 of Dialectical
Logic summarizes the reasoning that is the basis of the concept of nature as
prior to and independently of humankind.
So far so good.
Here he distinguishes between Marx
and Engel's theories of human activity and Hegel's idealism by
recapitulating their description of man as a product and force of nature
that transforms nature into the instruments of his activity in appropriating
nature's goods and producing from them the means for the perpetuation of his
body organic and inorganic.
Fine, except that with the diversification of human expertise, the
self-reproduction of society's cognitive and practical interests means that
some investigations by some individuals may not necessarily be directed
towards the ends of instrumental self-preservation, though of course
indirectly every human activity--play being the most universal
example--develops skills that are always instrumentally useful in the end.
Nothing could more clearly describe the
independence of abstract nature from the emergence of human activity in the
world. After all, if man has his origins in the development of the natural
world, then nature as a whole precedes and is a prerequisite for human
activity. Nature regarded abstractly cannot be described as a product of
human activity Then too, the laws and principles of nature whereby men
transform nature into the instruments and products of labour are hardly a
product of pure logic, of men's unfettered imagination. The laws of nature
as men know and accommodate their actions to them are firmly connected to
the physical and sensual properties of man the organism and to the natural
conditions he confronts in the course of his prosecution of labour activity.
Men do not produce in a vacuum which they then fill with ideas and concepts.
Nature is a partner with man in his determination and production of his
needs, and its presence is identifiable in all human activity in the world.
Fine.
All these descriptions of nature relate directly to the interaction of man
with nature as a force of nature, and not one of these statements asserts
some sort of universal state of being for nature itself.
Faulty reasoning. The first half of the sentence is tautological; the
second half is an inappropriate inference.
The activist interpretation of men's relation to the world first
proposed by Kant,
further developed by Hegel and given a material natural interpretation by
Marx and Engels obviates all necessity to make broad ontological statements
about the world in order to realize the objects of theory.
I completely disagree.
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