(My reformatting doesn't seem to work _ CB) Jim Farmelant :
I think that we should keep in mind that Engels and the logical positivists meant different things by the term "metaphysics." Engels followed in Hegel's footsteps by equating metaphysics with the discipline that attempts to delineate what is seen as the eternal, unchanging aspects of reality, whereas the positivists equated metaphysics with the making assertions about the world that are not even in principle empirically verifiable. To be sure that is considerable overlap between what the two conceptions of metaphysics encompasses. Both metaphysics in the sense outlined by Engels and metaphysics as conceived by the positivists will tend to treat on such issues as the existence of God, whether or not ultimate reality is material or mental in nature and so forth. At the same time, many dialectical materialists have asserted that logical positivism was metaphysical in Engels' sense while the positivists have likewise tended to brand dialectical materialism as metaphysics. It seems to me that both schools might be correct from the standpoints of their own conceptions of metaphysics. Many of the logical positivists did after all attempt to do things like what Carnap attempted to do with his *Aufbau* in attempting to reconstruct scientific knowledge along phenomenalist lines, which to a dialectical materialist would seem to be metaphysical in their sense of the word. And diamat ideas like Engels' three laws of dialectics would seem to qualify as metaphysics in the sense that the positivists gave to that word. ^^^^^^^ CB: On positivists equating metaphysics with making assertions about the world that are not even in principle empirically verifiable, of course, dialectical materialists are _materialists_ and materialists _are_ empiricists ,i.e. do not believe in making assertions about the world that are not even in principle empirically based. That's the first thing about Marx and Engels . They are materialists. So, I'm not sure how the positivists missed the "materialism" in dialectical materialism. And there is evidence of dialecticality in the material world. Hegel gives many examples. There is as much evidence of dialectics in the real world as of formal logic, logicalists', positivist and otherwise, favorite. So, the positivists can't say that the dialectics in dialectical materialism is not based on evidence in principle. It 's based on evidence in fact. It is not _a priori_ , but _ a posteriori_,it is based on experience. It ( the generalization that objective reality is dialectical in its motion) is based on social and transgenerational experience, not just the immediate sense datum experience of Marx and Engels or Hegel. Ah , but is the claim of the existence of dialectics in objective reality based on practice ? That would be the Marxist test. > > andie nachgeborenen ________________________________ > > Marx rejected philosophy as ideology; I don't think he > paid special attention to metaphysics. Engels' piece > of Feuerbach is really limited to Marxism as the end > of German idealism. (As such he's probably right about > that, even if his idea that revolutionary practice > will replace philosophical anlysiswas over > optimistic.) Many people think that Marx didn't > escape philosophy, including metaphysics. In this > connection I'd recommend Dan Brudny's Marx's Attempt > To Escape Philosophy, a very thoughtful study witha > really brilliant chapter on Feuerbach. > > People have been announcing the end of metaphysics > since at least Kant, who is the first thinker I know > to make a really substantial case that there's no such > thing as metaphysical knowledge. That is half the > argument of the Critique of Pure reason, against the > "dogmatists" (Descartes and especially Leibniz and his > acolytes), the orther half is the argument against the > skeptics (Hume) and subjective idealists (Berkeley) > that knowledge of the empirical world is possible. So > marxsim doesn't have priority on this. > > The LP's attempt to squelch metaphysics failed. It > just won't go away. People won't stop asking in the > abstract way philosophersa sk these questions, things > like, whether the mind is distinct from the body in > some way, whether thereal world is really real, what > is the nature of causation, whether there is any such > thing as free will, whether determinism is true, that > is the relations of parts to wholes, whether people > and other things are in some sense the same thing over > time, and the like. Wittengstein's attempt to show > somehow that even asking such questions is a symptom > of some sort of error has not caiught on, nor has > Rorty's dumbed down version of the same idae, atht > only people who brainwashed into asking such questions > by taking philosophy courses would ask such questions. > (Untrue, as anyone who has taught phil 101 can > testify.) Nor is the Marxist claim very plausible that > revolutionary practice somehow dosplaces philosophy > very plausible -- it may do so in the of not leaving > much time for philosophy, but even (for example) Lenin > found that doing philosophy, indeed metaphysics > sometimes (Materialism and Empiriocriticism is a > defense of realism) was part of his revolutionary > practice. > > So, yes, there's philosophy. It's likely here to stay. > It changes over time, different questions interest > people depending on the problems that confront them, > but despite the pronouncements of the End Of > Philosophy, philosophy is not over. > > jks > _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
