On Fri, 9 Dec 2005 18:01:01 -0500 (GMT-05:00) Ralph Dumain
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> JKS expressed himself rather badly for a professional philosopher, 
> esp. quoting Rorty, but Charles isn't making this any easier.

Well Justin is now a professional attorney, so that is sort of
to be expected. For that matter Charles is too but we don't
hold that against him.

> 
> One big terminological point: the word 'metaphysics' has plural core 
> meanings, not to mention the way Engels mucked up the word by his 
> usage of it.

I think I made a similar point a little while back.  For Engels,
metaphysics denotes theories that posit reality as understandable
in terms of eternal and unchanging being as opposed to
becoming. The logical positivists, on the other hand, used
the term to denote theories that purport to describe reality
but are inherently not verifiable and are not not analytic.
Nevertheless, is there is some overlap between the two
conceptions of metaphysics.  Therories about God and
universal mind would be classified as metaphysical
under either conception.  Hegel's Absolute Spirit, may
not, however, qualify as metaphysical under Engels'
conception.

> 
> The objectionable meaning of 'metaphysics' refers to a priori 
> speculative idealism  Whether it postulates eternal entities or 
> emphasizes becoming (as in the case of Heraclitus or Taoism) hardly 
> matters.  What matters is the degree to whether any metaphysical 
> approach of this type yield insights into or obfuscates reality.
> 
> The innocent meaning of 'metaphysics' is basically synonymous with 
> 'ontology', or abstract models of being, entities, and their 
> relations.  Some extreme positions (e.g. Carnap) would claim that 
> this too is meaningless metaphysics, but it ain't the same thing.  
> Philosophers are still addressing these questions, but not 
> necessarily in the manner of speculative idealism.

Even Carnap addressed some of these questions but he redefined
them as being linguistic issues rather than as metaphysical ones.
Thus he thought it was meaningful for philosophers to inquire
about the relation of mind and body provided that it was properly
framed as an issue concerning the relationships between mentalist
language and physicalist language. In fact he thought the former
was reducible to the latter, so that Carnap qualified as a kind
of materialist.

> 
> The interest in emergent properties would be one area of ontology of 
> continuing concern.
> 
> 
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