> Heidegger sees logical positivism as the culmination > of a project begun with Descartes, "a mode of thinking according to > which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus > accommodation of grounding of Dasein in the disclosing being, but > truth is rather diverted into certainty--to the mere securing of > thought, and in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all > that is not thinkable by it." (22)
That was interesting because it explains the so-called analytic vs. continental division in basically 'Germanic' terms. I would say, though, Heidegger is reacting more to the attention that logical positivism was getting among intellectuals. The breaks occur way before. See, for example, the exchanges between Frege and Husserl. One reason why Wittgenstein intrigues so many is he moved across the analytic and the continental 'traditions', baffling the logical positivists. Rorty seemed original to people in the analytic tradition mostly because he didn't devalue continental philosophy and understood it better than most of his peers. Is it too much to say, though, that German-language analytics were largely absorbed by the US and UK? I find the distinction between analytic and continental traditions rather useless for engaging philosophy seriously (much of Marxist political philosophy never fit into either rough category), but it can be used to help explain, for example, what happened in linguistics after the structuralists. It doesn't mean that there are two schools of linguistics, but the various schools can be traced back to these two usually diverging streams of thought. C _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
