On Fri, Jan 16, 2009 at 1:19 PM, tyler <casi...@usermail.com> wrote:
> It applies to almost everything, because that is how the human mind usually
> perceives the world.
>

As someone who almost went to grad school to study 20th-century
metaphysics and philosophy of mind, I can't let this go by without
comment.  Tyler, you've already strayed in this discussion far out of
physics per se into philosophy of science, not that there's anything
wrong with that!  However, the formalist point of view you're
advocating (that scientific theories do not describe real entities but
rather models consistent with repeatable observation) certainly cannot
be generalized in the way you just have without opening the door to an
awfully thorny can of metaphysical worms (mixed metaphor very much
intentional!).  You're glossing over centuries of debate, going back
at least to the Enlightenment empiricists (Locke, Hume, Berkeley) in
the 17th century, through Wittgenstein in the mid-20th, and beyond.

I for one am not at all prepared to abandon wholesale the ontological
distinctions among reality, my perceptions of it, and my mental
constructs resulting therefrom; I find those distinctions useful,
congenial, and well-founded.  Many of our perceptions do form patterns
to which it is convenient to give names; but let us not confuse the
pattern with the thing perceived, lest we put the ontological cart
before the horse and begin to think that patterns we have invented out
of whole cloth are themselves as real as the perceived ones or the
things themselves.  For example, I would argue (1) that the computer
on which I'm typing this is a real, physical entity; (2) that the
computational process going on which puts letters on the screen as I
type is not an entity at all, but solely a convenient way to group
some of my perceptions (and those of the programmers who wrote the
software); and (3) that the numerals on the clock at the bottom of the
screen represent real but nonphysical entities, the natural numbers,
which (just like the laptop) exist independently of my perception of
them---but all three of those assertions are debatable and have been
debated by philosophers in recent memory.

Alex Chamberlain
'87 300D Turbo, or at least a bundle of perceptions of it

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