Well, the real point is was this a "stupid pilot" error or an error the pilot made when he though he was doing something else, or alternatively a training issue where the pilot did something he should not have when he thought he was doing something else, and what he did was what he was taught to do.

One does NOT land one of these things like one does a single engine Cesna on a clear day with no wind, I suspect the only time they are landed without autothrottle control is when something is wrong with the aircraft. It's foolish to manually control the airspeed when the autospeed does a better job anyway.

We will see, the NTSB generally does a superb job of accident investigation, and what exactly happened will get ferreted out eventually. Probably going to take some time, though.

This is similar to the AA DC-10 crash in Chicago back in the mid 70's where the engine came off just after liftoff. The crew failed to correct for the loss of lift on the affected wing due to leading edge slat retraction upon hydraulic failure and the aircraft rolled over and crashed. It was very easy to compensate for, all the crew had to do was retract the slat on the other side to balance the lift, so you could call that pilot error. However, since the power for the mis- match slat extension warning was supplied only by the engine that ripped off, there was no warning and the plane rolled over too far to recover before the crew could fix it. They DID cotton on the the problem, but only after it was too late to save the plane.

Was that pilot error? No, every single DC-10 pilot who flew the "accident" on a simulator crashed the plane, every time. If the slat mis-match warning was enabled, every single one flew it out with no issues and "landed" safely.

Pilot error?  Not really.

If the Asiana crew thought the autothrottle was set and working, as it always was on landing a 777, and it did NOT control the speed as the aircraft approached the set landing speed AND there was no audible or visual warning that the speed was not being controlled by the autothrottle, is that pilot error or a training/equipment problem? There is, from what I've read, at least one flight mode where the autothrottle is deactivated AND the speed warning/autothrottle failure is ALSO deactivated (look up "FLCH trap"on the 777).

Remember, SFO ATC is well known for not giving final approach clearance until the landing aircraft is past the inital flight slope and too high, requiring some fancy flying to get the plane down to glide slope and into stable approach conditions. The ALPA has been complaining for decades, this is not a new problem.

So think this scenario: ATC doesn't give landing clearance until the ASIANA flight is past the initial point on the glide slope. This is against company rules, since it requires an un-stabilized approach, but it's routine at SFO. It's also not a big problem, but to get down to glide slope, it's necessary to idle way back on the engines and descend a bit faster than normal. This is a computer operated plane, you don't manually handle the throttles much, you select the speed you want and the rate of descent. However, since you are over the glide slope, you have to use some flight mode on the computer that lets you do so, and in this case, if the crew selected FLCH (flight level change) and did NOT realized that doing so deactivates the auto throttle AND the auto throttle "failed to engage -- speed too low" warning, we are in a situation where the crew expects the autothrottle to control the speed and is NOT watching the rate of speed loss very carefully, they are watching to make sure they achieve glide slope and don't have to go around to avoid an over-run by landing too fast too far down the runway.

During the last few seconds of the approach, the engines don't come up, speed starts to drop below set landing speed, crew has to figure out why (remember, they always use auto throttle speed control), and oops, crash. By the time the failure of the engine power to come up when expected gets processed by the crew and they ram the throttles wide open, it's about 10 seconds too late to avoid the crash. Throttle application on a 777 is timing critical, that bus descends fast and takes a lot of thrust to stop a descent. By the time the speed drops below selected landing speed you are at least 5, probably 10, seconds LATE on throttle application and there is absolutely nothing that can be done to fix it, you are going to stall.

Obviously, the crew expected the speed to be automatically controlled, and it was a very nasty surprise when it wasn't.

Now, where is the error? Is it "stupid pilots" who recklessly fail to set the autothrottles? Is it improper training -- never use FLCH mode to descend to glide slope (did anyone make sure the pilots knew FLCH would leave them with NO autothrottle and NO wanings)? Did SFO ATC give them a grossly inappropriate approach, leaving them to decide after 11 hours in the air to demand a go-around at a busy airport, burning lots of extra fuel and causing delays or to land without a stabilized approach?

Not a simple issue and just saying "stupid pilot can't fly" isn't the answer. Training might very well be part of the issue (it usually is from what I've read), but a very large portion of safety work, including flying and landing aircraft, is to make sure people CAN"T make mistakes that crash planes, blow up plants, cut peoples body parts off, etc. It should not be possible to select a computer control mode during final approach that disables both autothrottle AND speed failure/autothrottle not activated warnings, as doing so will very often cause the plane to crash even if the pilots are monitoring the speed. PIlot error or bad software/instrumentation design?

Peter

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