Tuk, all, On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko <m...@tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote: > Dan, all, > > > > On 23-Oct-16 2:10, Dan Glover wrote: >> >> Tuk, all, >> >> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko >> <m...@tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote: >>> >>> Dan, all, >>> >>> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is about >>> the >>> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67. The >>> annotation includes the following statement: >>> >>> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces >>> ideas, >>> which produce what we know as matter." >>> >>> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency >>> and >>> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They cannot >>> be >>> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism >>> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is logically >>> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism. >>> >>> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says >>> that >>> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!" >>> >>> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that the >>> MOQ >>> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either >>> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics. >> >> Dan: >> The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig >> goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as >> a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance: >> >> "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided >> into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social >> patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all >> there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic, >> Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing," >> that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any >> encyclopedia, is absent >> >> 'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive. >> They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost >> independent of each other.." [Lila] >> >> Dan comments: >> There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate >> at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means, >> idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same >> time. > > > > Tuukka: > > I think your reply demonstrates how amateurs of logic might be inclined to > find many-valued logics more useful than they really are.
Dan: So you I take it make a profession of logic and as such are saying people like Kurt Gödel and Neils Bohr and Robert Pirsig are wrong. So what chance do I stand? > > In fuzzy logic the only truth values aren't true or false like they are in > classical logic. Instead, a truth value may be any real number from 0 > (false) to 1 (true). > > At first this seems like an improvement. But what could you do with it in > this case? > > You could use it to argue that your options are: > > * To concede that the MOQ isn't completely consistent. > * To concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea. > * To concede that the MOQ doesn't completely solve the mind-matter problem. > * To modify the MOQ. > > Would this really improve your situation? You'd still have to choose. And if > you were to choose anything else than modifying the MOQ you'd kind of need > to explain what would you mean. > > Suppose you decided to concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea. > Then what would be the moral value of the MOQ on a scale from 0 to 1? Would > it be 0.5? Or 0.75? Something else? And most importantly, how would you have > determined this value? > > You don't seem like you could explain that. And it would be quite > disappointing if you chose one of these fuzzy logic concessions anyway. > > You could also try to use three-valued logic to argue that your options are: > > * To concede that the consistency of the MOQ is unknown. > * To concede that the moral value of the MOQ is unknown. > * To concede that it is unknown whether the MOQ solves the mind-matter > problem. > * To modify the MOQ. > > To me these options don't seem better than your original options. I think > they're worse because, like with fuzzy logic, it wouldn't be enough that > you'd just select a concession you'd want to make. You'd also need to > explain what would you mean with your concession. Your original options > don't require you to explain that. Dan: No idea. > > >> So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good >> ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a >> person focuses exclusively upon one or the other. > > > > Tuukka: > > Which one do you find me to have focused on exclusively, idealism or > materialism? Dan: That depends. > > Where does Pirsig state that idealism is a good idea? In LC RMP annotation > 67 he states idealism to be true. He doesn't state that it's good. Dan: Truth isn't a shining ideal in the MOQ. Truth is a high quality intellectual value pattern, in other words, good. > > Obviously, truth and morality are not equivalent. Most people agree that in > some situations it is moral to lie. Dan: Again with the either/or. But yes, in the MOQ, truth and morality are equivalent. And sometimes, truth can be a lie we tell to make someone feel better. > > >> >>> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. So >>> we >>> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent. >>> >>> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter >>> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However, >>> Pirsig >>> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the MOQ >>> is a >>> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single >>> metaphysics. >>> >>> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas. >>> >>> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism. >>> >>> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea. >> >> Dan: >> Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters. > > > > Tuukka: > If either/or parameters are faulty, you should neither posit that either/or > parameters are faulty nor posit that they're not faulty. To do either would > be to posit an either/or parameter. And to do both would be to posit a > contradiction. Dan: I didn't say all either/or parameters are faulty though you seem to think I did. Other than that, again, no idea. Thank you, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html