Wim, you warm my heart.

And warming my ego helps in that activity.

I'll admit, I've been a little preoccupied lately with a pet indulgence of mine (discussion of God) and I was getting worked up about it.  I wrote out a post saying several things (mainly my frustration) and then had it deleted when my *bleep*ing e-mail program suffered a system shut-down.  That, of course, frustrated me even more.  I stomped around my apartment for awhile, trying to figure out how I would re-say what I already expelled from my mind, when two new posts arrived on the subject and I lost all desire to re-write a consequently sub-par message.

I won't try and re-hash what was lost.  Mainly 'cuz I've found something else worth hashing over and somebody who wants to hash over it with me.

Yay!

Okay,
First:  this Supreme Subject you speak of.  I'm not sure I understand the thrust of your argument at the "meta-level".  You said two posts ago that "we can only come farther than "because I say so" by intersubjective agreement" without a Supreme Subject.  Indeed, that's as far as we can get in metaphysics in general.  Metaphysics is the "meta-level".  The intersubjective agreement is not just based on "because I say so" statements.  They are based on "I say so because of this evidence that I will now present to you".  As Pirsig says, "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience, and economy of explanation."

Of course, the next question is "Where do those tests come from?"  Well, they came from us.  We made them up because it was fairly useful to do so.  I guess the thrust of my argument is that I don't quite agree with your split into a meta-level.  Any argument at this meta-level is an intellectual pattern.  All arguments are at the intellctual level.  Where could they otherwise be?  And thusly, supposed "meta-level" arguments are subject to the same rules (i.e. whatever rules we agree on) as static intellectual pattern rules.  Hence, some of my rephrasings.  (As for the God appendix to your meta-level discussion, I suggest staying out of it completely.  It will get you know where here.)

On to the argument with Oakeshott!

At this point, I think it is important to point out that Oakeshott is no man.  Not that he didn't exist, but that we have to supply all words from his mouth.  I basically created the structure of the platform that "no-man-Oakeshott" is standing on.  I created it because "real-man-Oakeshott" would have liked it.  And that's why I named the no man position Oakeshott.  As such, it is very important to remember that we are arguing against ourselves.  We have to convince ourselves that our argument is sound.  That there is no way a person in the future could come across the MoQ and point out that Pirsig was wrong in assigning DQ the top domain.

I think it is helpful to understand the consequenses of an alternatively-centered-MoQ.  Therefore we know what is at stake.  Thus, the slight fleshing out of Oakeshott.  Evil, evil Oakeshott.  So our argument with Oakeshott should not take anything for granted.  Especially James and/or agreeing on metaphysics.  All of this means that our argument for DQ 'betterness' over SQ needs to be air-tight on its own.  Or effectively air-tight.  Or at least agreeable.

The route you went, Wim, in your last post was essentially for that of coherence.  Oakeshott has to agree with DQ-as-better because its the only way to understand the MoQ.  While it was an interesting play-by-play (and real-man-Oakeshott might have succumbed to it) I think there was one problem:

1.  Assuming no-man-Oakeshott thinks Victorian patterns are the greatest things ever.
That's bad because it succumbs Oakeshott to defeat.  The Oakeshott position is better defended by saying that the Victorian patterns aren't any better than, say, the Elizabethan patterns.  They are just different.  A type of Kuhnian historicism.  We've lost the Elizabethan patterns and now have Victorian patterns.  It wasn't good to lose the Elizabethan patterns because the Elizabethan identity was lost.  Identities (static patterns) are not good to change by radical Dynamic Quality.  Taking an historical-incommensurability/relativism stance gives Oakeshott a chance to say that all we can be sure of is the present static patterns and we have to hold on to these static patterns as our only platform to say anything of value.

That's the short version and it's why I don't think arguing for the internal cohesion of the MoQ will stop no-man-Oakeshott from coming along and appropriating it for his own perverse purposes.

Always fun,

Matt

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