Nelson B wrote:
> 
> Today, mozilla has a set of "trust flags" for each CA cert stored in
> the profile, or in the "built-in" root CA list.
> For each such CA cert, there are effectively 3 trust flags
> (there are more, but only 3 are exposed through the UI)
> which are:
>     trusted to issue SSL server certificates,
>     trusted to issue S/MIME certificates, and
>     trusted to issue "object signing" certificates.
>       (object signing refers to signing of downloaded java and javascript)
> 
> Each of these is binary, represented as a checkbox.
> 
> One could imagine that instead of binary, these have levels of trust.
> I would initially propose three levels:
>     High assurance (banking, e-commerce)
>     Low assurance  (when no money is involved).
>     No assurance   (untrusted.)
> 
> CA's would come with preconfigured levels of assurance, just as they do
> now, but there would be 3 levels, not 2.
> 
> I would propose that when viewing a web site with a low assurance root CA,
> some kind of large ugly icon be displayed in the chrome, with a "tool tip"
> that says something like "This web site may or may not be who they say".
> 
> I would also propose that for email settings (e.g. SMTPS, IMAPS), the
> user would have a way of telling mozilla, "only allow the connection to
> this server if the root CA for it is (.) high, ( ) low assurance."
> 
> This is mostly a PSM change.  NSS would answer the question: "is it
> trusted at all?" (as NSS does now) and PSM would have to seperately
> determine (perhaps through a separate NSS function call) the level
> of that assurance.
> 
> This might allow the mozilla foundation to ship CA certs whose full
> trustwrthiness cannot readily be determined.

I would hope that all CA certificates that are included in the
default certificate database were issued by CAs whose practices
have been audited by independent, outside auditors.  Those
practices include both how they protect their own private
certificates that they use for signing and also how much care they
take when issuing and signing a Web site's certificate.  All this
should be addressed in the proposed Mozilla Foundation policy that
is another thread in this newsgroup.  

-- 

David E. Ross
<http://www.rossde.com/>  

I use Mozilla as my Web browser because I want a browser that 
complies with Web standards.  See <http://www.mozilla.org/>.
_______________________________________________
mozilla-crypto mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto

Reply via email to