Kikx wrote:
Gervase Markham wrote:

SSL3 has a mechanism for detecting an attacker attempting to downgrade a
connection between two SSL3 endpoints to SSL2 in order to MITM it, if
that's what you mean.

I don't understand your point ... I have writen a program a couple of
month before with downgrade a connection to SSL 2 without any warning ...

So, you've implemented a version rollback attack.  That's an active attack,
but is not the same as an MITM.

And I can't understand how the "mechanism" works because before the
handshake you have no security and as the attaker ask for an SSL2
connexion, there is no more checksum for the transaction in clear text
... then as the transaction in clear are not checked ... the attaker can
do whatever he wants !!!! (assuming that both of endpoints will accept
such a level of encryption)

Please read appendix E.2 of the SSL3 specification and TLS standard.
(It's the same appendix and same text in both documents).
SSL3 spec:    http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/draft302.txt
TLS standard: http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt

When a client that is capable of speaking SSL3 does an SSL2 RSA encryption
operation, it includes some information in the encrypted data that
identifies it as an SSL3 capable client.  If the server is a real ssl2-only
server, it will ignore this information and proceed normally.  If the
server is one that is capable of using both SSL2 and SSL3/TLS, then it
should detect that it is talking with the SSL2 protocol to an SSL3-capable
client, and should treat that as a sign of a version rollback attack.
It can then terminate the handshake with an SSL3/TLS alert about the
rollback, or if it is an https server, it can complete the handshake but
then return a web page that reports the attack.

But not all SSL2+SSL3 capable servers implement that rollback attack
detection.  I'd guess that the server you used is one of those that does not.

--
Nelson B
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