On Saturday 28 May 2005 02:14, Tyler Close wrote:
> On 5/27/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > And, both petname and trustbar were roundly rejected
> > by the Mozilla security community.  Strike two.
>
> My understanding was that no one on this list has the authority to
> introduce a new tool into the Firefox UI and the only person who has
> that authority, Ben Goodger, doesn't read this list.

Authority is sort of the wrong way to look at it.  MoPro
is like many open source projects a volunteer and
consensual project.  However security tends to be
best treated as the override to that, and it is one of
the differentiators between things like Mozilla and
the security projects like the crypto and BSD groups
that the latter have clearly defined strategic security
directors.

Perhaps a better way to frame it is that there is no
security leadership or direction.  It's absent.

Which leads (by a few hop, skips and jumps) to
another future.  One way to move forward is to
create a branch and start shipping your own
version.  One oriented towards what your views
are on user security.  This is in fact what Ben
Goodger did with Firefox, but his focus was on
other things.  To do that one would need a clear
view ahead for many months of hard hacking I'd
suspect;  something I've never had.

> Seems like more 
> of a dead end than a rejection. Not very encouraging either way, but
> it's not "roundly rejected". At least, I thought not. I admit I had
> hoped for more from this mailing list.


Well, I hate to be the wet blanket.  Whatever you
want to term it, it was the same thing as happened
to Trustbar, to Gerv's stuff, to the SSH bug fix
suggestions that were filed, back in history to the
Smith&Ye project.  There is strong correlation here.

In the most summary terms anything that can be
thought of as changing the security model is
rejected.  As all these things change the model
to fix the insecurities in the model - of course -
they are all rejected on the basis that they change
the model.

So we are at an impasse, and that won't change
until there is a disaster I suspect.  I'm hoping that
the disaster will be Microsoft showing the way with
the Lonhorn update, as the alternate is someone
publishing some real stats on how many MoPro
users have been phished, which would be much
much worse because that raises liability.

iang
-- 
Advances in Financial Cryptography:
   https://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000458.html
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