On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 12:09:49PM -0000, Mutt wrote: > mk[sd]temp() exist as handy temp creators that avoid foot shooting. > But if you care about the resultant filename, you can make your > own. That's mentioned in the open(.. O_CREAT|O_EXCL ..) in the spec > below.
Sure, you can make your own custom temp file creator, but the whole point of having a library function is that getting this right is much harder than it seems at first glance, and the OS should make it easy for you. But besides, that IS what Mutt has... its own custom temp file creator. Which uses mktemp() to generate file names. Which is totally fine. > # mkstemp() - secure family > http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mkstemp.html > # mktemp() - insecure, removed from spec mktemp() IS NOT insecure. The way it has been used over the years is. The warning is, in fact, a lie; it's an overreaction to a related but DIFFERENT problem. Writing your own random filename generator would essentially amount to re-writing mktemp(), except that it would likely be less secure (potentially due to insufficient randomness, etc.), unless you knew what you were doing. So replacing mktemp() is pointless. So long as the weakness is documented (which it is), and the way to use it correctly is understood (which it is), there's no problem with mktemp(). It's unfortunate if there are redundant code blocks, but that is not a bug, per se. It might be worth opening a bug to get them cleaned up. If there are calls to fopen() which are for writing, these should be looked at, and if they're correct, a comment to that effect is probably worthwhile, in similar fashion to the sprintf() comments... Regardless, concerning the mktemp compiler warning, the easiest and best solution is to ignore the warning. It is patently wrong. > It's the O_EXCL that protects you, not the stats. If you mean stat(), I don't think I ever said anything about stat(), unless you're talking about the stat() which mktemp() does to try to make sure it does not give you a file name that already exists. You're correct that this does not protect you... No one here ever said it did. If you're talking about the file modes, then you're mistaken. It's the combination of O_EXCL AND the file mode that protects you. YOU NEED BOTH. An attacker could otherwise simply wait until you've created your temp file, open it for write, and write their exploit into it, right over whatever you wrote. Is this easy? No (the writing is if your file modes allow it; the guessing of the correct file name is not). But it has been demonstrated that brute-forcing it IS possible. > 'When you go to create it' implies beforehand, which is wrong. > Only the O_EXCL can save you from the race. No, it doesn't imply that at all. When you go to create it: open(..., O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600); This is what Mutt does. -- Derek D. Martin http://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG Key ID: 0xDFBEAD02 -=-=-=-=- This message is posted from an invalid address. Replying to it will result in undeliverable mail due to spam prevention. Sorry for the inconvenience.
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